Effect of the Affordable Care Act on utilization of emergency and primary care by Shafer, Paul
 
EFFECT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON 
UTILIZATION OF EMERGENCY AND PRIMARY CARE 
 
Paul Ronald Shafer 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 



















































Paul Ronald Shafer 






Paul Ronald Shafer: Effect of the Affordable Care Act  
on Utilization of Emergency and Primary Care 
(Under the direction of Justin Trogdon) 
 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has considerably reduced the uninsured rate nationally 
through availability of guaranteed issue private plans (Marketplace) and Medicaid expansion. 
However, expanding access to health insurance coverage may not be a sufficient incentive for 
consumers to change their usual setting for care, reduce avoidable use of emergency departments 
(ED), or increase use of preventive care. One of the core arguments for expansion has been that 
individuals without coverage may forego preventive care, delay treatment, and subsequently 
overutilize the ED––leading to worse health outcomes and higher long-run health expenditures. 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of the ACA on substitution between 
ED and primary care among the newly insured (aim 1), potential delayed effects of coverage gains 
on avoidable use of the ED (aim 2), and whether high deductibles serve as a barrier to the use of 
no-cost preventive services (aim 3). 
Aim 1 uses the linkage between the 2012 National Health Interview Survey and 2013 and 
2014 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to quantify substitution between the ED and primary care 
settings using linear and multinomial logistic regression models. Aim 2 uses the Healthcare Cost 
and Utilization Project State Inpatient and Emergency Department Databases for 2008 to 2016 to 
identify the effect trajectory of coverage gains on avoidable ED use using county-level fixed 
effects and spatial regression models. Aim 3 uses insurance claims from IBM Health® 
 iv 
MarketScan® for 2008 through 2016 to estimate the effect of high deductible health plan 
enrollment on use of high-value preventive services using difference-in-differences models. 
This project will provide new understanding of how consumers respond to coverage gains 
at both the individual and population level with a focus on emergency and primary care services—
two ends of the health care spectrum that can often be substitutable, particularly for the newly 
insured. It will address if and when consumers substitute towards a more appropriate setting for 
care and also how eliminating cost sharing affects use of preventive services. These insights can 
be used to refine benefit design, consumer education, and expectations about the costs and health 
benefits of future reforms.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Affordable Care Act 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 was passed with the goal of 
expanding access to health insurance to the uninsured in the United States through an expansion 
of state Medicaid eligibility and subsidized individual coverage offered through state insurance 
exchanges. The ACA originally intended for the expansion of Medicaid coverage to be mandatory 
across all states, expanding coverage to all individuals and families at or below 138% of the federal 
poverty level regardless of meeting prior categorical eligibility requirements. However, a 2012 
Supreme Court decision made the Medicaid expansion optional and 14 states have chosen not to 
adopt it as of February 2019 (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019a; Supreme Court of the United 
States, 2012). For the first three years of Medicaid expansion under the ACA (2014 through 2016), 
the federal government covered 100% of the costs for newly eligible enrollees before a gradual 
decline to its long-term contribution of 90% in 2020 and thereafter (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2011). This is in contrast to the prevailing Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage, the federal contribution to Medicaid spending based on state average per capita income 
relative to the national average, that ranged from a minimum of a 50% up to a high of 73% (for 
Mississippi) in fiscal year 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation, n.d.). As a result of the Supreme Court 
decision, there is an eligibility gap in those states that did not expand Medicaid in which 
individuals can make too much to qualify for Medicaid coverage (or never qualify regardless of 
income, in the case of childless adults in many states) but not enough to qualify for subsidized 
private coverage in the Marketplace (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018a, 2019b), as the collection 
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of state health insurance exchanges is commonly known. Those in the coverage gap have little 
hope of obtaining affordable coverage unless employer-based coverage is or becomes an option. 
Under the ACA, states were given the flexibility to setup insurance exchanges in one of 
several forms—a state-based marketplace (fully designed and implemented by the state), state-
based marketplace–federal platform or state-federal partnership marketplace (all or most functions 
performed by the state except for the enrollment platform), or a federally-facilitated marketplace 
(completely managed by the federal government). In the Marketplace, individuals between 100% 
and 400% of the federal poverty are eligible for subsidies in the form of advanced premium tax 
credits to help them purchase private insurance coverage from participating insurers in their state. 
Many who have qualified for subsidized individual coverage through the exchange are still in 
danger of delaying or refusing to seek care because of high deductibles that require enrollees to 
pay for the first several thousands of dollars’ worth of services received each year. The in-network 
deductible and out-of-pocket maximum were capped at $6,350 for self-only coverage and $12,700 
for family coverage for the 2014 plan year (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015a), increasing slightly 
each year thereafter. These caps are doubled for out-of-network coverage, an important factor 
given the prevalence of so-called narrow network plans, or those plans with more restrictive 
provider networks that qualify for in-network cost sharing, in the Marketplace (Sen, Chen, Cox, 
& Epstein, 2017; Zhu, Zhang, & Polsky, 2017). Both cost sharing and provider availability have 
implications for how individuals will use health care after gaining coverage. 
Expectations of ACA effects on health care use 
Utilization of hospital emergency departments as a safety net provider for non-emergent 
care by the uninsured was often cited as a problem by hospitals, providers, and public health 
researchers (American College of Emergency Physicians, 2004; Derlet & Richards, 2008; National 
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Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems, 2013). Overutilization of the ED has 
implications not only for hospitals and their budgets, but for other patients as well. ED crowding 
has been linked to quality of care measures, including timeliness of and satisfaction with care 
provided, as well as health outcomes (Bernstein et al., 2009; Mullins & Pines, 2014; Stang, Crotts, 
Johnson, Hartling, & Guttmann, 2015). There is widespread disagreement about the size of the 
problem and focusing on ED use for non-emergent or preventable conditions as a problem rather 
than only a symptom of a larger problem (e.g., unmet social needs, lack of access) may be 
misplaced (Uscher-Pines, Pines, Kellermann, Gillen, & Mehrotra, 2013). 
The ACA is the most fundamental national reform of the health insurance system since the 
passage of Medicare and Medicaid as amendments to the Social Security Act in 1965. As such, 
there was little empirical evidence from which to draw conclusions about the potential impact of 
the ACA on health care use. Prior studies have examined the impact of earlier state-based 
expansions of Medicaid on health care utilization for distinct services and provider types. 
Providers are an important component of any model of coverage expansion as physicians may 
respond to changes in service volume and reimbursement rates, a concept referred to as induced 
demand. Empirical evidence of provider induced demand exists for both the U.S. and abroad (Janet 
Currie & Gruber, 2001; Gosden et al., 2000; van Dijk et al., 2013). We will largely ignore the 
potential for induced demand as a component of the effects of coverage expansion on health care 
use, as the literature does, but it is an important factor to keep in mind. 
The mechanism of interest in this dissertation––changes in health insurance coverage 
created by the passage and implementation of the Affordable Care Act––provides an opportunity 
to study how individuals respond to coverage gains in utilizing emergency and primary care 
services, including if and when substitution across these settings begins to occur. This conceptual 
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model (Figure 1) was adapted from the Aday and Andersen framework on access to care in which 
“health policy” has an impact on “characteristics of population at risk”, which is related to 
“utilization of health services” including the “type”, “site”, and “purpose” of medical care used 
(Aday & Andersen, 1974). Using that framework, insurance coverage can be considered a 
“mutable” (changeable) “enabling” factor for individuals that has an effect on how they consume 
health care. The pathway highlighted in Figure 1 is the focus for the three aims in this study with 
the other factors (i.e., access to care, health status, health behaviors, demographics) serving as 
covariates. Expenditures are not the focus of this study; however, changes in spending on 
preventive services will be discussed in the third aim. 




 We can draw on evidence from prior changes in state Medicaid eligibility criteria to 
develop hypotheses for how Medicaid expansion under the ACA may impact health care utilization 















around three distinct groups of patients: adults, children, and pregnant women. Generally, we 
would expect expansions of eligibility and/or coverage to result in increases in utilization; 
however, shifting between types of services is also possible. For example, we could hypothesize 
that newly covered adults may be more likely to visit a primary care provider instead of using the 
ED as a safety net. The short-term implications for utilization from this type of behavior are less 
clear, though obviously one could expect long-term cost savings and improvement in health 
outcomes from earlier diagnosis and greater use of less expensive types of providers and treatment. 
Adults 
 For adults, we will review the findings from five studies, four of which looked at changes 
in eligibility or benefits in five states (Tennessee, Kentucky, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Oregon). 
The final study is a longer-term comparison of utilization across 10 states that expanded Medicaid 
in the 2000s with 14 bordering states that did not change their eligibility or benefits. Reducing 
eligibility and increasing cost sharing tended to result in lower utilization of services among the 
insured population. Increasing eligibility or benefits showed mixed results, with positive changes 
(reduction in preventable admissions) in some states, but null or poor findings (no changes in ED 
use, low uptake of wellness visits) in other states. 
In 2005, Tennessee made adjustments to TennCare, its state Medicaid program, under the 
guise of keeping it solvent that resulted in 171,000 adult enrollees (of 1.4 million total enrollees) 
losing coverage. Heavrin and colleagues used state hospital administrative data on all emergency 
department visits from 2004 to 2006 to assess the effect of TennCare disenrollment on ED 
utilization (Heavrin, Fu, Han, Storrow, & Lowe, 2011). Total mean weekly ED visits statewide 
dropped by nearly 1,200 after disenrollment (p<0.01), with TennCare experiencing a 3,100 visit 
decline (p<0.01) compared to a 2,200 visit increase among the uninsured (p<0.01). Changes in 
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weekly mean ED visits for private insurance, Medicare, and other coverage were either not 
significant and/or a change of less than 150 visits per week. Since weekly totals do not account for 
the relative size of each payer population, the authors also examined changes in payer composition 
of ED visits descriptively and using multivariate analysis. They found that proportion of visits 
decreased for TennCare (30.6% to 24.4%, p<0.01) and increased for the uninsured (12.2% to 
17.5%, p<0.01) with both results persisting in fully adjusted models. Similarly, for visits per 
person-year, they found a decrease for TennCare (0.910 to 0.885, p<0.01) and an increase for the 
uninsured (0.455 to 0.587, p<0.01). Though overall ED volume did not markedly increase as one 
might hypothesize, it is clear from their findings that disenrollment was associated with an 
increased “role of the Tennessee ED as a safety net provider” (Heavrin et al., 2011). 
Kentucky and Idaho made adjustments to their state Medicaid programs soon after the 2005 
Deficit Reduction Act was signed into law in February 2006. Kentucky implemented copayments 
for physician visits, prescription drugs, and inpatient hospital stays and coinsurance for non-
emergent use of the ED in July 2006 with increases in some reimbursement rates following in July 
2007. Idaho added coverage for annual wellness exams, cancer screenings, tobacco cessation, and 
weight management programs in July 2006 as well as dental coverage with increased 
reimbursement rates through a managed care organization in September 2007. Marton and 
colleagues used enrollment and claims data from Kentucky and Idaho from 2004 to 2008 to 
examine the effects of these policy changes on utilization (Marton, Kenney, Pelletier, Talbert, & 
Klein, 2012). The policy changes had little effect on utilization of services in Kentucky, where the 
only significant findings were a slight decrease in probability of an inpatient stay during the year 
(18% to 17.6%, p<0.01) and a 4% decline in probability of taking more than one brand name 
prescription per month (p<0.01). In Idaho, only 9% of adults took advantage of the annual wellness 
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visit newly covered under their plan during the period following the benefit change. These findings 
indicate that adding copayments and limitations on name-brand prescription drug use had little 
impact on overall utilization of services and prescriptions, with perhaps some small amount of 
shifting from name-brand to generic drugs. Also, providing free well-care visits did not result in 
significant uptake of preventive services, at least in the short term. 
In 2006, Massachusetts passed what became a model for the Affordable Care Act in an 
effort to provide and require health insurance coverage for all residents. This was accomplished 
through an expansion of MassHealth, the state Medicaid program, and the creation of CommCare, 
through which eligible residents could obtain free or subsidized coverage in the new state health 
insurance exchange, referred to as the Connector. Kolstad and Kowalski used difference-in-
difference models to examine the effects of the statewide coverage expansion on length of hospital 
stays and admissions from the emergency department (Kolstad & Kowalski, 2012). Unfortunately, 
their study design could not isolate the specific impact of the Medicaid expansion since the other 
coverage expansions were happening at the same time. They observed that health reform in 
Massachusetts was associated with a 36% decline in uninsurance among the inpatient hospital 
population, which was also associated with decreased length of stay, preventable admissions, and 
hospital cost growth. 
In 2003, the Oregon Health Plan instituted premiums and copayments for many services 
under its OHP Standard plan, the state’s Medicaid expansion for those between 100% and 175% 
FPL. Those in OHP Plus, enrolled under the federally mandated Medicaid eligibility criteria saw 
no change to their benefits. Lowe and colleagues examined whether the institution of a $50 
copayment for ED visits impacted use, measured by number of ED visits per enrollee per year 
(Lowe, Fu, & Gallia, 2010). Under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
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Act, EDs were unable to refuse to provide service if an enrollee was unable to pay the copayment 
and the copayment requirement itself was ultimately reversed by a court order in June 2004. They 
used administrative and claims data for participants enrolled in the OHP from 2001 to 2004, 
excluding dual eligible, minors, and those with special eligibility from the study, providing a pre-
post examination of the benefit changes. ED use by OHP Standard enrollees decreased by 16% 
(aOR=0.84, 95% CI=0.83, 0.86) as a result of the imposition of the copayment before recovering 
9% of the decline after the copayment was reversed (aOR=1.09, 95% CI=1.06, 1.12). ED use was 
still approximately 8% lower after the copayment was reversed compared to before the benefit 
changes (aOR=0.92, 95% CI=0.89, 0.95). Their findings indicate that increases in cost sharing for 
Medicaid patients had a negative effect on ED utilization, even after the copayment for ED services 
was nullified by a court order. 
An analysis of Kaiser Family Foundation data from 1999 to 2011 found that state-based 
Medicaid expansions in 10 states between 2000 and 2009 were not associated with a change in the 
percentage of enrollees with high ED utilization (≥2 emergency visits per year) when compared 
with enrollees in 14 bordering states that did not expand Medicaid (Ndumele, Mor, Allen, Burgess, 
& Trivedi, 2014). It provides evidence that expanding Medicaid eligibility was not associated with 
changes in high use of ED services among adults, suggesting that providing health insurance 
coverage may not necessarily change ED utilization habits among low-income individuals. 
Children 
 This section describes two studies examining the effect of changes in Medicaid eligibility 
and benefits on utilization by children. One is a study focusing on the number of doctor visits and 
hospitalizations within the last year as a result of a federally-mandated eligibility expansion while 
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the other examined effects of increased service coverage and reimbursement rate changes for 
medical and dental services in Kentucky and Idaho.  
In the early 1980s, eligibility for Medicaid was determined by participation in Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, a cash transfer (welfare) program for very low-income 
families. By 1992, federal Medicaid rules required states to expand coverage to groups of children 
in poor families with incomes higher than the AFDC limits (ages 0-5: up to 133% FPL, ages 6-19: 
up to 100% FPL; optional coverage for infants up to 185% FPL). Currie and Gruber exploit the 
variation in the timing and specific eligibility criteria employed by each state to assess the impact 
of Medicaid eligibility on health care utilization in children (J Currie & Gruber, 1996). Using data 
from the Current Population Survey, they first estimated that the takeup rate, or enrollment in 
Medicaid as a result of the expanded eligibility criteria between 1984 and 1992 had an upper bound 
of 71%, indicating that nearly 30% of those eligible were not enrolling. The CPS data were used 
to impute income for similar households in the National Health Interview Survey, where incomes 
are only reported within a range and are missing for some households. Medicaid eligibility was 
associated with a 9.6% drop in likelihood of not having a doctor visit in the last year, nearly halving 
the baseline probability, and a 4.0% increase in likelihood of hospitalization within the last year, 
nearly doubling the baseline probability. Their analysis indicates that Medicaid expansions, even 
with less than perfect uptake by those newly eligible, results in increased use of health care services 
by children. 
 Kentucky (with the exception of the Louisville area) and Idaho each used a joint delivery 
system for Medicaid and CHIP programs for medical and dental care for children, operating under 
a fee-for-service primary care case management model. Kentucky increased the number of 
preventive dental visits covered from one to two per year in July 2006 and increased Medicaid 
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reimbursement rates for well-child visits by 12.5% in July 2007. Similarly, Idaho increased 
reimbursement rates for well-child visits by 8% to 24%, created a premium forgiveness program 
for those keeping up with preventive care in January 2007, and increased reimbursement rates for 
dental care by outsourcing to an MCO in September 2007. Kenney and colleagues used Medicaid 
and CHIP enrollment and claims data prior to, during, and following the policy changes to examine 
medical (ages 0-18) and dental visits (ages 3-18) among children in Kentucky and Idaho (Kenney, 
Marton, Klein, Pelletier, & Talbert, 2011). In Kentucky, there was no association between the 
reimbursement increase and probability of having any annual well-child visits within the last year; 
however, there was a 16% increase in likelihood of having any annual preventive dental visits 
associated with the changes in dental coverage. In Idaho, probability of receiving any annual well-
child visits increased by 6% for children aged 0-5 and 19% for children aged 6-18. The 
reimbursement rate increase for dental services under the MCO were marginally associated with a 
small increase (2 percentage points) in probability of a preventive dental visit. Their findings 
suggest that reimbursement rate and coverage increases for Medicaid and CHIP-covered children 
in Kentucky and Idaho were associated with increases in medical and dental care use to varying 
degrees. 
Pregnant women 
This section describes two studies examining the effect of Medicaid expansion for pregnant 
women, one in California and another nationally, both from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their 
findings show increases in utilization, with some seemingly beneficial (number of prenatal visits) 




As a result of a federal mandate to expand coverage for prenatal and maternity care, 
California expanded eligibility for pregnant women in Medi-Cal, the state’s Medicaid program, in 
1989 and again in 1990. Eligibility rose from the prior income limit of approximately 100% of the 
federal poverty level to 185% in July 1989 and 200% in January 1990. Braveman and colleagues 
conduced an analysis of birth certificates for singleton (single child) in-state births to state 
residents in 1990 to assess the effect of insurance status on untimely and insufficient care 
(Braveman, Bennett, Lewis, Egerter, & Showstack, 1993). Women on Medi-Cal were at higher 
risk for untimely care (aOR=3.33, 95% CI=3.26, 3.40), defined as initiation of care occurring after 
the first trimester, than the reference group (women with private fee-for-service insurance). 
Notably, this was worse than the likelihood of uninsured women receiving untimely care 
(aOR=2.54, 95% CI=2.47, 2.60). Compared to the reference group, women with Medi-Cal were 
less likely to have had insufficient prenatal care (aOR=1.63, 95% CI=1.60, 1.66), among those 
receiving any prenatal care, than those who were uninsured (aOR=2.49, 95% CI=2.44, 2.55). This 
study is limited by the lack of longitudinal data with which to look at average changes in utilization 
before and after these expansions or the ability to differentiate women eligible under the prior 
eligibility requirements versus the expanded limits. However, it does provide evidence that 
expanded Medicaid coverage for pregnant women is positively associated with an increased 
number of prenatal visits, despite seemingly having no effect on timely initiation of care. 
Currie and Gruber used national birth certificate data from 1989 to 1992 to study the effect 
of Medicaid eligibility on childbirth treatment decisions (Janet Currie & Gruber, 2001), focusing 
on four procedures listed on birth certificates: 1) Cesarean section delivery, 2) use of a fetal 
monitor, 3) induced labor, and 4) ultrasounds. Birth certificates do not contain the mother’s 
insurance status prior to pregnancy nor was that information available in the Detail Natality data 
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obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics. As such, they chose to stratify the sample 
of childbirths by characteristics strongly correlated with availability of private insurance coverage, 
such as age, education, and marital status. They used this to infer which pathway a mother likely 
took to Medicaid coverage, either transitioning from being uninsured to gaining Medicaid 
coverage during pregnancy or transitioning from private insurance to Medicaid as eligibility 
expanded in the late 1980s for pregnant women. They estimated that a 10% increase in proportion 
of pregnant women eligible for Medicaid was associated with increases of 0.32% for Cesarean 
section delivery, 0.92% for use of a fetal monitor, 0.19% for induction of labor, and 0.55% for 
ultrasound among the group of women gaining coverage through Medicaid. Conversely, they 
found that a 10% increase in proportion eligible for Medicaid was associated with decreases of 
0.79% for Cesarean section delivery, 0.53% for use of a fetal monitor, 0.30% for induction of 
labor, and 0.21% for ultrasound among the group of pregnant women transitioning from private 
insurance to Medicaid. Patterns of treatment intensity generally increased for those transitioning 
from being uninsured to newly Medicaid-eligible but decreased for those transitioning from private 
to public insurance, demonstrating that physicians may be responding to economic incentives via 
differences in reimbursement rates (Medicaid reimbursements were approximately half that of 
private insurers at the time). 
Quality of included studies 
For adults, this review consisted of a single multi-state analysis and four studies that 
included five individual states. They showed that reducing eligibility and increasing cost sharing 
generally resulted in lower utilization while increasing eligibility or benefits yielded mixed 
findings. The methods used were generally rigorous and lend support to the conclusions drawn 
from these studies. Ndumele et al. (2014) uses a difference-in-difference quasi-experimental 
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design to examine annualized ED use between Medicaid enrollees in expansion and matched 
control states; however, its conclusions are limited by a small cross-sectional sample (particularly 
in expansion states) and lack of multivariate analysis. Heavrin et al. (2011) uses administrative 
data from all ED visits in Tennessee for two years prior to and following disenrollment of 171,000 
participants from TennCare. While longer periods would be preferable, weekly data were used in 
their multivariate analysis so sample sizes were not an issue. This study is helped by the fact that 
it is not based on claims data and therefore can incorporate all patients regardless of payer. Marton 
et al. (2012) uses Medicaid enrollment and claims data from Kentucky and Idaho to examine 
changes in utilization at the individual level. They use logistic and linear probability models to 
estimate the individual likelihood of several utilization outcomes; however, this ignores possible 
changes in continuous utilization outcomes such as number of visits, length of inpatient stay, etc. 
Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) uses a nationally representative sample of hospitals with a 
difference-in-differences design to look at hospital utilization in Massachusetts versus the rest of 
the United States following Massachusetts health reform in 2006. Lowe et al. (2010) uses 
administrative data from Medicaid enrollees to conduct a comparison group analysis of ED visits 
over time between those enrollees subject to increased cost sharing and those not. 
By virtue of a multi-state sample and expansion design similar to the ACA in 
Massachusetts (e.g., insurance mandate and private marketplace with subsidized coverage), 
Ndumele et al. (2014) and Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) are the most useful for projecting effects 
of the expansions of private insurance and Medicaid on health care utilization for adults under the 
ACA. The other studies were conducted in primarily smaller states outside of the South, which is 
where most of the population growth in the U.S. has been concentrated (Johnson, Jr. & Kasarda, 
2011). Also, much of the population growth is comprised of Hispanics (Johnson, Jr. & Kasarda, 
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2011), who may have a higher likelihood of being uninsured (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2005), lower 
health literacy (Sentell & Braun, 2012), and cultural norms around health and health care that 
encourage delayed treatment (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, n.d.). Therefore, the impact of coverage on utilization may not be as 
strongly positive or shift as much utilization to earlier and less intensive treatment as we might 
expect. Prior studies in states with larger Hispanic populations, like California or Texas, if they 
exist, may provide more useful evidence for potential effects of increased coverage for the fastest 
growing segment of the U.S. population. 
For children, this review consisted of a national analysis and one other study conducted on 
two individual states (Kentucky and Idaho), which generally indicated increases in utilization as a 
result of eligibility expansions and increased coverage. The methods in these two studies were 
quite rigorous; however, there were significant issues with the data used in both studies, which 
casts doubt on the generalizability of their findings. Currie and Gruber (1996) uses large nationally 
representative surveys (CPS and NHIS) from which to draw its conclusions. It imputes Medicaid 
eligibility for children based on demographics and socioeconomic data in CPS and then uses the 
likelihood of a given child being eligible (by state, age, and year) to instrument for individual 
eligibility when analyzing outcomes in NHIS. While sophisticated and statistically unbiased, this 
approach could not truly account for the changes in coverage over time for specific individuals. 
Kenney et al. (2011) uses Medicaid enrollment and claims data from Kentucky and Idaho to 
examine changes in utilization at the individual level with logistic regression and hazard models. 
However, data on children served at rural and community health centers in Idaho were not 
available, which could be a significant source of bias in a largely rural state. These two studies 
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provide limited evidence from which to project what effect the ACA may have on utilization 
among children, though it would seem safe to assume that increased coverage for children would 
be associated with increased utilization. However, youth are generally less costly (i.e. use fewer 
services) than other age groups (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.-b), covered 
at higher rates due to pre-ACA Medicaid and CHIP availability, and mandatory immunizations for 
school entry in many states already serve to encourage parents to bring their children for regular 
wellness visits. Therefore, the impact of expanded coverage for children under the ACA may be 
muted.  
For pregnant women, this review consisted of a national analysis and another study 
conducted using data from California. The findings show increases in utilization associated with 
greater Medicaid eligibility, with mixed judgments related to the suitability of care (more prenatal 
visits, higher likelihood of a Caesarian section delivery). Currie and Gruber (2001) uses national 
birth certificate data from which to draw their conclusions about treatment intensity; however, they 
are only able to relate this to general trends in eligibility for public insurance coverage as their data 
do not include the mother’s insurance coverage status and type. Braveman et al. (1993) uses a 
similar approach; however, California birth certificates includes sources of payment for prenatal 
care and expected source for the delivery that allows for directly estimating differences in prenatal 
care outcomes based on the mother’s insurance coverage. However, unless we can establish that 
the Medi-Cal population is similar to the population of low-income pregnant women nationally, it 
is not clear that we can project what impact Medicaid expansions under the ACA may have. 
Similarly, given the age of both studies, it is not clear whether these findings are generalizable to 
the current health care environment. However, it would be counterintuitive based on these results 
and economic theory to expect lower utilization as a result of expanded insurance coverage for 
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pregnant women under the ACA. Perhaps the most important question for researchers and 
policymakers, based on the findings of Currie and Gruber (2001), is whether expanded insurance 
coverage will yield unnecessarily intensive care rather than simple increases in utilization, as 
prenatal care is relatively standardized in terms of recommended visit and testing schedules 
compared to other health conditions (American Academy of Pediatrics & American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2012). 
The findings described above generally demonstrate that eligibility and benefit expansions 
in Medicaid are associated with increases in utilization of preventive services and decreases in 
utilization of more intensive care. Similarly, we find that increases in cost sharing or outright 
disenrollment from Medicaid coverage is associated with decreased utilization by those still 
insured but also have the potential unintended consequence of increases in the use of more 
expensive care, such as ED visits, by those newly uninsured. With the passage of the ACA in 2010, 
there was an expectation among policymakers and patient advocates that those newly covered, 
either through the Marketplace or through Medicaid expansion, would be able to more affordably 
access preventive services and thus shift utilization away from providers (hospitals) and services 
of last resort (ED visits, preventable hospital admissions). This is meant to bend the cost curve 
downwards over time by providing earlier treatment of disease and better management of chronic 
conditions, reducing long-term health care expenditures and improving health outcomes. While 
this review does not address health outcomes, the evidence based on past Medicaid expansions 
shows that at least some of the desired behavior associated with this type of policy can be expected 
as a result of the ACA. 
As this is not a systematic review, it is possible that studies not included may have findings 
that directly conflict with those included and as such, the implications drawn above may be biased 
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or incomplete. I am also limited by the fact that many studies do not address underlying factors 
that may also impact access and utilization of services in a given state, such as Medicaid provider 
participation and reimbursement rates relative to other public and private insurers. Many of the 
studies included are for individual states and those effects may not be generalizable to the 
population at-large for various reasons (e.g. health literacy, cultural beliefs, access to providers, 
demographics, etc.). This was largely unavoidable due to the limited number of changes to national 
Medicaid eligibility and benefits over the past few decades. However, each patient population 
studied in this review had one study that was either national or covered a large number of states. 
Post-ACA 
 As we are now nearly a decade from the original passage of the ACA and more than five 
years into implementation of its two primary coverage expansions, the Marketplace and Medicaid 
expansion, there is some evidence of its effects on use of the ED and primary care services. The 
first few years after the introduction of the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion in 2014 showed 
substantial declines in uninsurance and evidence of improvements in self-reported health and 
preventive service use (Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2018; Sommers, 
Maylone, Blendon, Orav, & Epstein, 2017). Despite worries about primary care appointment 
availability with a large influx of newly insured patients, widespread issues never materialized 
(Rhodes et al., 2017). It is possible that although availability for new patients did not worsen, wait 
times and other availability barriers were enough to make primary care inconvenient and would 
dampen substitution away from the ED. The ACA led to improvements in individuals reporting a 
usual source of care (Wherry & Miller, 2016) and there are signs that the commercially insured in 
a single national insurer (Aetna) shifted treatment for “low-acuity” conditions away from ED 
settings in the last few years (Poon, Schuur, & Mehrotra, 2018). 
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Previous studies have estimated the effect of coverage gains on ED utilization after ACA 
implementation (Nikpay, Freedman, Levy, & Buchmueller, 2017; Sommers, Blendon, Orav, & 
Epstein, 2016; Sommers et al., 2017), yielding mixed findings. Nikpay et al. (2017) found that 
total ED use increased in Medicaid expansion states by 2.5 visits more after 2014 relative to non-
expansion states (95% CI: 1.1, 3.9). Conversely, Sommers et al. (2016) found that Medicaid 
expansion was associated with a significantly decreased probability of any ED use (−6.0 
percentage points, p<0.05) and lower use of the ED as a usual source of care (-6.1 percentage 
points, p<0.01) along with a corresponding increased use of primary care visits (0.7 per person-
year, p<0.05). Sommers et al. (2017) found significant decreases in the probability of any ED use 
in 2015 (-5.8 percentage points, p<0.01) and 2016 (-6.6 percentage points, p<0.01) in two 
Medicaid expansion states (Arkansas and Kentucky) relative to a non-expansion state (Texas), but 
no change in average ED visits. 
Specific aims 
 In this dissertation, I chose to focus on non-elderly adults (18 to 64 years of age) given that 
they had the least generous prevailing coverage environment prior to the ACA outside of 
employer-sponsored insurance. Each of the three populations for which I described the pre-ACA 
evidence above had very different eligibility profiles for Medicaid before expansion and relative 
costs for non-group commercial insurance. I assess the impact of the ACA on health care use 
among non-elderly adults through the following three aims, filling in gaps in our knowledge about 
its effects. 
1) Is persistence of uninsurance associated with substitution between emergency department 
and primary care use? This aim uses longitudinal data from a linkage between two federal 
surveys (National Health Interview Survey and Medical Expenditure Panel Survey) to 
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associate insurance status with changes in person-level patterns of ED and primary care 
visits in 2013 and 2014. It uses the first year of the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion 
to provide a large set of individuals transitioning into coverage, also exploring how 
utilization responses vary by the differences in cost sharing burden between public and 
private coverage. 
2) Is there a delayed effect of coverage gains under the ACA on non-emergent ED visit rates? 
This aim uses data on ED discharges from seven states from the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases and State Emergency Department Databases 
from 2008 through 2016. This allows for the isolation of pre-existing trends prior to large 
coverage gains in the years following the passage of the ACA. Two algorithms are used to 
identify preventable and non-emergent visits that are more likely to be substitutable to a 
primary care, retail clinic, and/or urgent care setting, exploring the presence of lagged 
effects and spatial correlation at the county level within states. 
3) Do high deductibles reduce the use of ‘free’ preventive services under the Affordable Care 
Act? This aim uses commercial health insurance claims data from IBM Health® 
MarketScan® to identify whether high deductible plan enrollment is associated with lower 
use of preventive services for which the Affordable Care Act eliminated cost sharing in 
late 2010. It uses a cohort of adults who are continuously insured in the same plan type to 
assess whether there is differential response to the price shock, employing a semi-
parametric difference-in-differences estimator to relax the parallel trends assumption. 
Implications 
Expansion of health insurance coverage to previously uninsured or underinsured (e.g., 
those with only catastrophic coverage, plans with high cost sharing) low-income adults allows for 
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a potential reallocation of care from more intensive and expensive care (e.g. emergency 
department, untreated chronic disease) to less costly preventive care (e.g. primary care, early 
detection and intervention for chronic disease), reducing the rate of growth in health care 
expenditures in the long run. The proposed research has broad implications for pursuing the triple 
aim—improving health and quality of care while reducing cost. Reductions in unnecessary 
emergency care and preventable chronic diseases could improve health and reduce costs 
significantly over the life course. It is crucial to understand whether the ACA is encouraging 
changes in individual decision-making around the appropriate setting for care, particularly among 
those who were previously uninsured. If deductibles and other cost sharing continue to serve as a 
barrier to seeking appropriate care, then the ACA may not impact patient decision-making as 
expected or hoped. Even though the goal of universal health insurance coverage is one that has yet 
to be attained in the United States, the ACA has brought us much closer than we have ever been. 
As the number of uninsured individuals decreases, it will be important for public and private payers 
to understand the ramifications for use of different types of providers and services, as this is critical 
to controlling the growth of health care expenditures and improving health outcomes. If data show 
that expanding health insurance coverage, particularly through Medicaid expansion for those 
below the Marketplace subsidy eligibility threshold, is successful in reducing overall medical 
costs, this would provide a strong economic argument to expanding Medicaid in the remaining 





CHAPTER 2: IS PERSISTENCE OF UNINSURANCE ASSOCIATED  
WITH SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT AND  
PRIMARY CARE USE? 
 
Introduction 
More efficient use of health care resources is often touted by policymakers, insurers, 
employers, and others as a goal of health insurance reforms along with improvements in access, 
affordability, and quality of care. Prior to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 
the majority of the evidence describing the effect of coverage on utilization was based on expanded 
eligibility for public coverage, primarily Medicaid, with the Massachusetts health reform of 2006 
serving as the notable exception. These eligibility changes yielded mixed results for emergency 
department and/or primary care utilization (Anderson, Dobkin, & Gross, 2014; Chen, Scheffler, & 
Chandra, 2011; Heavrin et al., 2011; Kolstad & Kowalski, 2012; Lowe et al., 2010; Marton et al., 
2012; Ndumele et al., 2014; Sommers & Simon, 2017; Taubman, Allen, Wright, Baicker, & 
Finkelstein, 2014). For example, the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment showed that coverage 
gains yielded persistently higher ED use two years after gaining coverage (Taubman et al., 2014). 
The state and local contexts for insurance expansion (e.g., baseline rates of coverage, health status) 
matter with recent work showing that these differences can explain seemingly contradictory 
findings in the past (Kowalski, 2018). 
The ACA took a multi-pronged approach to expansion (dependent coverage up to age 26, 
Medicaid expansion, guaranteed issue and subsidized coverage in the Marketplace) that has 
covered approximately 20 million Americans (Garrett & Gangopadhyaya, 2016). The first few 
years after the introduction of the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion in 2014 showed substantial 
 
 22 
declines in uninsurance and evidence of improvements in self-reported health and preventive 
service use (Courtemanche et al., 2018; Sommers et al., 2017). Despite worries about PC 
appointment availability with a large influx of newly insured patients, widespread issues never 
materialized (Rhodes et al., 2017). However, it is possible that although availability for new 
patients did not worsen, wait times and other availability barriers were enough to make PC 
inconvenient and would depress transitions away from the ED. The ACA led to improvements in 
individuals reporting a usual source of care (Wherry & Miller, 2016), but research has not yet 
empirically addressed whether patients are actually changing their usual setting for care in 
response to coverage gains. Increasing length of time uninsured has been associated with lower 
access to care and those with insurance instability are more likely to use the ED as a primary source 
of care (Abdus, 2014; Schoen & DesRoches, 2000). However, to our knowledge, the relationship 
between changes in health care utilization and persistence of uninsurance prior to gaining coverage 
has not been examined in depth. Another gap is the failure to measure substitution across settings, 
or shifts in utilization between ED and PC after gaining coverage. Instead, studies often evaluate 
utilization within each setting separately. This study addresses both of these gaps by quantifying 
substitution between ED and PC settings within the same individuals over time and assessing 
whether persistence of uninsurance is associated with how patients use care once insured using a 
nationally representative sample. 
Methods 
Data 
This study uses a restricted linkage between the 2012 National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS) and the 2013 and 2014 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) as its primary data 
source (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2009; Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention, 2018). These years were chosen due to the implementation of the two largest ACA 
coverage expansions in 2014 (Medicaid expansion and Marketplace), providing a large number of 
individuals transitioning from uninsurance into coverage. We merged on data from the Area Health 
Resources File to capture county-level population characteristics and access to health care. We 
also used the Marketplace Public Use Files from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
and data published by the Kaiser Family Foundation to create measures of Marketplace plan 
availability and costs in 2014, the first year in which the health insurance exchanges were in 
operation. This study was approved as exempt by the Non-Biomedical Institutional Review Board 
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (#17-0774). 
Sample 
We focused on nonelderly adults (18 to 64 years of age in both years) to isolate those 
individuals whose coverage status and health care utilization would be most affected by the 
introduction of the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion (n=9,605) (Figure 2). We dropped 
individuals who were not present in all 5 rounds of data collection (e.g., death, military service, 
incarceration) or were covered by Medicare in either year (e.g., dual eligible, disabled). Because 
of challenges attributing utilization changes for individuals who had partial coverage or multiple 
payers in 2014, we only included those who were continuously insured (covered for all 12 months) 
and who had a single payer type (i.e., private, Medicaid, TRICARE, other public) in 2014 
regardless of their insurance status in 2013 and earlier. We then matched this MEPS analytic 
sample to the 2012 NHIS adult sample, yielding an analytic sample of 6,435 individuals or 






 To assess substitution between ED and primary care, we first calculated the year-over-year 
change in utilization (the number of visits in 2014 minus the number of visits in 2013) within each 
setting separately for each individual in the analytic sample. We defined primary care visits in each 
year as the total number of office-based visits (as opposed to outpatient clinic visits) with a 
physician, physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or nurse. Visits to other types of providers (e.g., 
PT/OT, chiropractor, optometrist, dentist) were not included. Then, we generated a four-level 
categorical outcome for year-over-year substitution between settings with the following mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive categories: 1) increase in both ED and primary care visits (>ED, >PC); 
2) same or fewer ED visits with an increase in primary care visits (£ED, >PC); 3) increase in ED 
visits with the same or fewer primary care visits, (>ED, £PC); and 4) same or fewer of both primary 
care and ED visits (£ED, £PC). 
Persistence of uninsurance prior to 2014 was the explanatory variable of interest, defined 
as being continuously insured (covered for all of 2013); transiently uninsured (covered for at least 
one month in 2013 but not the full year); or persistently uninsured (uninsured for all of 2013) 
(Cannon, 2004; Short, Graefe, & Schoen, 2003). Among those categorized as persistently 
uninsured, over 80% (81.7%) were continuously uninsured for at least 36 months, providing a 
strong justification for considering this group as meaningfully different in health insurance 
experience than those only transiently uninsured. 
We used several individual and family-level demographic characteristics in our analysis, 
including age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, employment status, marital status, household size, 
and family income as a percentage of the federal poverty level. We also derived several health and 
health insurance-related measures for use in our analysis. We created an indicator of self-reported 
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health decline based on the year-over-year change (2013 to 2014) in perceived health status and 
an indicator for having an ambulatory care sensitive condition in 2013 (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2001; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015). We captured 
payer type in 2014 (i.e., private, public) to look for differential effects by benefit design (e.g., 
exposure to significant cost-sharing). Using the 2012 NHIS data, we created an indicator for 
having a declinable pre-existing condition for health insurance underwriting purposes using a 
methodology developed by the Kaiser Family Foundation (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016b). 
We included several state and county-level factors associated with access to care and health 
insurance along with characteristics of the socioeconomic environment in our analysis. Quartiles 
for the number of hospitals with an ED, number of primary care physicians, number of physician 
extenders, number of federally qualified health centers, and whether the county was a health 
professional shortage area were used to describe the availability of providers in each county 
(Health Resources and Services Administration, 2016). We also included unemployment rate, 
percentage of population non-white, in poverty, and uninsured, and whether the county was non-
metro to account for the socioeconomic environment. Medicaid expansion status, number of 
Marketplace insurers, and average benchmark Marketplace premium for 2014 were used to 
describe the availability and affordability of health insurance in each state. 
Statistical analysis 
We used separate linear regression models to estimate the relationship between transient 
and persistent uninsurance on changes in emergency department visits and changes in primary care 
visits relative to the continuously insured group, controlling for individual-, family-, and area-level 
characteristics. Similarly, we used multinomial logistic regression models to estimate the 
association between persistence of uninsurance and substitution across settings. We estimated 
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marginal effects of transient and persistent uninsurance on the predicted probability of being in 
each substitution category relative to the continuously insured group. As we are focused on 
individual-level changes in utilization rather than state-level policy differences (e.g., differences 
in Medicaid provider reimbursement rates), we include state fixed effects to account for any 
remaining time-invariant unobservable differences between states. We used the survey weights 
and design effects provided to account for the complex sampling design. All analyses were 
conducted in Stata® 15 for Linux (StataCorp, 2017b). 
We also ran stratified versions of these analyses by presence of a declinable pre-existing 
condition (in 2012), having a visit for an ambulatory care sensitive condition (in 2013), and payer 
type (in 2014). We also performed numerous sensitivity analyses, including 1) raising the lower 
bound on age to 27 (as the dependent coverage provision allowed parents to include children up 
to the age of 26), 2) dropping those with family incomes over 400% of the federal poverty level 
(not eligible for advanced premium tax credits in the Marketplace), and 3) excluding those with 
no utilization in both years. 
We are often interested in the causal effect of a policy change or change in benefit design 
on health or use of health care, needing to model or otherwise account for selection bias that results 
in different populations (i.e., demographics, socioeconomic status, health status) ending up in 
different pre-treatment or pre-intervention groups. A diverse set of individual-, household-, and 
state-level factors combine to result in an extended spell of forced or voluntary uninsurance, not 
easily identified with a single instrument for an instrumental variables or regression discontinuity 
analysis. Also, in this case, simply describing the observed experience has immense value. As 
additional states adopt Medicaid expansion or changes are implemented to the Affordable Care 
Act in the future, the ability to project changes in health care use and the associated costs will be 
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dependent on the profile of individuals who are potentially gaining coverage, including their 
experience with health insurance coverage, health literacy, and potential pent-up demand for health 
care. 
Results 
The mean age in our weighted sample was 41.2 years old with the two uninsured groups 
being significantly younger (transiently uninsured: 36.0, persistently uninsured: 38.9) than the 
continuously insured group (41.6) (Table 1). The sample was 52.5% female overall with only the 
transiently uninsured group (61.2% female) skewed noticeably away from a near even split. The 
percentage of each insurance status group that is white non-Hispanic decreases as persistence of 
uninsurance increased, from more than two-thirds (67.3%) for the continuously insured group to 
about half (50.9%) for the persistently uninsured group. Educational attainment, being employed, 
being married, and household income were all negatively associated with persistence of 
uninsurance.  
Across the three groups of insurance status in 2013, we do not find significant differences 
in number of hospitals with an ED, number of primary care physicians, or number of physician 
extenders by persistence of uninsurance. We do observe lower availability of federally qualified 
health centers (at the county-level) within the two uninsured groups. Those in the two uninsured 
groups were significantly more likely to live in a county with a higher percentage of its population 
non-white, unemployed, in poverty, and uninsured. We find no significant differences between 
groups by health professional shortage area status or being in a non-metro (rural) area. 
ED use is generally low with an average of approximately 0.2 visits per person per year, 
increasing slightly with persistence of uninsurance (Figure 3). In the baseline year (2013), primary 
care use was higher among the continuously insured group averaging approximately one additional 
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visit per year (3.3) than the transiently uninsured (2.2) and persistently uninsured (2.3) groups. 
Figure 4 shows survey weighted regression adjusted year-over-year change in ED and primary 
care utilization by persistence of uninsurance. We find no year-over-year change in ED use for the 
continuously insured and transiently uninsured groups but observe a small increase in ED use for 
the persistently uninsured group (0.06 visits per person, p<0.01). We observe small changes in 
year-over-year primary care utilization for the continuously insured (0.10 visit increase, p<0.01) 
and transiently uninsured (0.23 visit decrease, p<0.05) groups, but more than a one visit per year 
increase for the persistently uninsured group (1.10 visits per person, p<0.01). This sizable increase 
for the persistently uninsured group essentially catches it up with the continuously insured group 
once covered in 2014. These estimates of the year-over-year changes conform with the marginal 
effect estimates from our linear regression models of year-over-year change in ED and primary 
care utilization (Tables 2 and 3). 
Table 4 shows the predicted probabilities for each substitution category and marginal 
effects by persistence of uninsurance. Nearly 60% of people across all three groups (continuously 
insured, transiently uninsured, persistently uninsured) are predicted to stay the same or decrease 
utilization in both settings with very little variation between groups. None of the marginal effects 
of persistence of uninsurance on substitution are significant at the 0.05 level. Coefficient estimates 
for the substitution models are shown in Table 5 and the sensitivity analyses described above are 
shown in Tables 6 through 8. 
Table 9 shows the marginal effects of persistence of uninsurance on each of the three 
outcomes stratified by payer type, presence of a declinable pre-existing condition, and presence of 
an ambulatory care sensitive condition. We find that being on public insurance seems to be driving 
the small increase in ED use and large increase in PC use that we observed generally among the 
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persistently uninsured. For the persistently uninsured through 2013 who transitioned to public 
insurance (e.g., Medicaid) in 2014, we observe a 0.24 visit increase in ED use (p<0.01) and a 1.94 
visit increase in PC use (p<0.10) year-over-year. We find no changes among those who were 
persistently uninsured and gained private insurance or those who were transiently uninsured 
regardless of payer type gained in 2014. For the substitution outcome, we also observe a large 
negative marginal effect (-8.9 percentage points) of being persistently uninsured and gaining 
public insurance, relative to continuously insured, on the predicted probability of staying the same 
or decreasing utilization of both types of care, holding all else in the model constant, which 
indicates a shift towards increased utilization of one or both settings and is consistent with the 
other results shown. For this model only, we added state-level factors related to the ACA including 
Medicaid expansion status, number of Marketplace insurers, and the average benchmark premium 
to account for differences in plan competition and pricing across states.  
We do not find any significant differential effects of persistence of uninsurance on ED or 
PC visits by presence of a declinable pre-existing condition (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016b). 
Not having an ambulatory care sensitive condition was associated with increases in year-over-year 
ED utilization (transiently uninsured: 0.10, p<0.05; persistently uninsured: 0.09, p<0.05), but no 
significant changes for those with such a condition. However, we do observe an association 
between having an ambulatory care sensitive condition and PC use among the persistently 
uninsured. The marginal effect of being persistently uninsured, relative to continuously insured, is 
only a 0.42 visit increase in PC use among those without such a condition (p<0.05) but a 3.31 visit 
increase among those with an ambulatory care sensitive condition (p<0.10). We again observe 
little of significance for the substitution outcome except a 4.0 percentage point decline in the 
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predicted probability of increases in use of both settings for the transiently uninsured with an 
ambulatory care sensitive condition (p<0.05). 
Discussion 
Our study finds that persistently uninsured adults respond to coverage gains by changing 
how much and where they use health care. We observe a large increase in primary care utilization 
of over one visit per year on average among patients who were persistently uninsured and gained 
health insurance coverage, putting their primary care use in 2014 on par with those who were 
continuously insured (Figure 3). These changes seem to be driven by those gaining public 
insurance (e.g., Medicaid) with no notable changes found for those gaining private insurance, 
whether on- or off-exchange. We also found a very small but significant increase in ED visits for 
the persistently uninsured group that was also driven by those gaining public insurance, which fits 
with the findings of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (Baicker et al., 2013; Taubman et 
al., 2014). Those who have been persistently uninsured may have substantial health needs and 
pent-up demand for health care, seeing more physicians across multiple settings to get their health 
under control. One year may not be long enough to bring previously uncontrolled chronic 
conditions under control and avoid ED visits associated with exacerbations. Similarly, a recent 
study also found large increases in new primary care physician visits among payer (i.e., private, 
Medicaid) and plan switchers in the short run that diminish over time (Barnett et al., 2017), though 
it only looked at continuously insured individuals. Supply of primary care settings also matters as 
there were significantly fewer ED visits for “minor and preventable conditions” and sizable 
reductions in probability of ED use for those living near an open retail clinic in New Jersey 
(Alexander, Currie, & Schnell, 2017). Findings for the transiently uninsured group were 
inconsistent and warrant further study given their implications for continuity of care, particularly 
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as more states begin to experiment with so-called community engagement requirements (work 
requirements) in Medicaid that will likely increase churn. 
 This analysis has several limitations. Given the observational nature of this study, we are 
unable to make any causal claims about the relationships observed nor can we provide any 
qualitative understanding of the decision-making process for newly insured individuals about their 
use of health care. An instrumental variables analysis of the impact of payer type (e.g., cost-sharing 
burden differences between private and public coverage) could be possible by focusing on those 
between 100% and 138% of the federal poverty level using state Medicaid expansion status as an 
instrument; however, sample size in this data set was not sufficient to do so. It is also far from a 
foregone conclusion that Medicaid expansion could be considered to be a form of random 
assignment as these decisions are correlated with ideological and demographic composition of 
states (Jacobs & Callaghan, 2013; Michener, 2017; Rozier & Singer, 2016). Only having one year 
on each side of the coverage transition is another limitation due to potential health shocks or 
regression to the mean; however, we attempted to account for this by controlling for perceived 
changes in health year-over-year. This is also a short timeframe in which to observe behavior 
change, a patient would likely need long-term access to primary and specialty care before 
substantial shifts in ED utilization would occur. Our use of self-reported perceived health is 
imperfect but preferable to assessing the change in one or more diagnosis indicators that may only 
capture very substantial changes in health (e.g., cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes). Though 
we observe significant changes for the persistently uninsured group after gaining coverage, the 




Qualitative work from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment specifically noted that the 
“length of time people were insured might have been an important difference between those who 
reported mixed success and those who had success over time” (H. Allen, Wright, & Baicker, 2014). 
We find compelling evidence that expanding coverage to the long-term uninsured yields 
significant changes in utilization but not necessarily the desired substitution from the ED to 
primary care settings, at least in the short run. As policymakers at the state and federal levels 
consider changes to bring the remaining uninsured to gain coverage in the future (e.g., smoothing 
or removal of the Marketplace subsidy cliff, adoption of Medicaid expansion), it will be important 
to consider persistence of uninsurance as a piece of the puzzle in projecting the health care 
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Figure 3. Weighted average emergency department and primary care visits by persistence 




Figure 4. Weighted adjusted year-over-year change in emergency department and primary 
care visits by persistence of uninsurance, United States, 2013–2014 
 
 
* p<0.05 for year-over-year change not equal to zero 
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% or mean (standard error) 
Overall 










observations 6,435 5,555 251 629 
Individual-level 
Age* 41.2 (0.2) 41.6 (0.3) 36.0 (1.1) 38.9 (0.7) 
Sex*     
Female 52.5% 52.4% 61.2% 49.9% 
Male 47.5% 47.6% 38.8% 50.1% 
Race/ethnicity*     
White,  




11.4% 10.9% 19.2% 13.9% 
Hispanic 13.7% 12.5% 18.5% 26.8% 
Other,  
non-Hispanic 9.1% 9.3% 7.6% 8.3% 
Education*     
High school  
or less 31.0% 29.1% 40.9% 49.1% 
Some college or 
more 69.0% 70.9% 59.1% 50.9% 
Employed* 79.2% 80.6% 68.7% 66.4% 
Married* 57.6% 60.3% 35.8% 34.1% 
Household size 3.0 (0.04) 3.0 (0.04) 2.8 (0.2) 2.9 (0.1) 
Household income*     
0–99% 9.4% 7.7% 20.5% 24.5% 
100–199% 13.7% 11.5% 23.0% 36.0% 
200-400% 30.1% 30.1% 33.8% 28.0% 
>400% 46.8% 50.6% 22.7% 11.6% 
Perceived decline in 
health (from 2013 
to 2014)* 
22.8% 22.0% 27.3% 30.2% 









Number of hospitals 
with an ED 
(quartiles) 
    
1 – top 41.5% 41.7% 37.1% 41.3% 
2 17.6% 18.0%  16.4% 13.6% 
3 22.6% 22.8% 23.3% 20.4% 
4 – bottom 18.3% 17.5% 23.1% 24.7% 
Number of primary 
care physicians 
(quartiles) 
    
1 – top 30.9% 30.9% 29.9% 31.6% 
2 29.2% 29.5% 26.9% 26.0% 
3 21.6% 21.8% 19.4% 20.0% 
4 – bottom 18.4% 17.9% 23.9% 22.4% 
Number of physician 
extenders 
(quartiles) 
    
1 – top 31.0% 31.0% 28.3% 31.6% 
2 29.0% 29.3%  25.0% 26.7% 
3 20.5% 20.4% 25.0% 19.5% 
4 – bottom 19.6% 19.3% 21.8% 22.2% 




    
1 – top 34.8% 35.3% 29.8% 31.4% 
2 26.2% 26.7% 27.2% 20.1% 
3 23.4% 22.9% 22.0% 29.9% 
4 – bottom 15.6% 15.2% 21.0% 18.7% 
Percentage of county 
population non-
white* 
34.3% 33.9% 38.0% 36.8% 
Percentage of county 
population 
unemployed* 
7.3% 7.2% 7.8% 7.7% 
Percentage of county 
population in 
poverty* 
15.5% 15.3% 17.1% 16.8% 
Percentage of county 
population 
uninsured* 
19.5% 19.2% 22.3% 21.9% 
Health professional 
shortage area 35.8% 35.3% 38.5% 40.0% 
Non-metro area 13.9% 13.8% 13.0% 16.2% 





Table 2. Weighted linear regression estimates of year-over-year change in emergency 
department visits, United States, 2013–2014 
  
Change in emergency 
department visits 
Coefficient (standard error) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Persistence of uninsurance 
prior to 2014     
Continuously insured – – – – 














Controls     
Individual-level   X X X 
County-level    X X 
State fixed effects    X 
Number of observations 6,435 6,371 6,371 6,371 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Individual-level controls include age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, employment status, marital status, 
household size, household income, presence of a perceived decline in health, and presence of an ambulatory 
care sensitive condition. County-level controls include number of hospitals with an ED (quartiles), number of 
primary care physicians (quartiles), number of physician extenders (quartiles), number of federally qualified 
health centers (quartiles), percentage of population non-white, percentage of population unemployed, 
percentage of population in poverty, percentage of population uninsured, being in a health professional 
shortage area, and non-metro area. 
 
Table 3. Weighted linear regression estimates of year-over-year change in primary care 
visits, United States, 2013–2014 
 
Change in primary care 
visits 
Coefficient (standard error) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Persistence of uninsurance 
prior to 2014     
Continuously insured – – – – 














Controls     
Individual-level   X X X 
County-level    X X 
State fixed effects    X 
Number of observations 6,435 6,371 6,371 6,371 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Individual-level controls include age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, employment status, marital status, 
household size, household income, presence of a perceived decline in health, and presence of an ambulatory 
care sensitive condition. County-level controls include number of hospitals with an ED (quartiles), number of 
primary care physicians (quartiles), number of physician extenders (quartiles), number of federally qualified 
health centers (quartiles), percentage of population non-white, percentage of population unemployed, 
percentage of population in poverty, percentage of population uninsured, being in a health professional 
shortage area, and non-metro area. 
 
 38 
Table 4. Predicted probabilities of substitution and marginal effects by persistence of 
uninsurance prior to 2014, United States, 2013–2014 
 
Outcome 















>ED, >PC 5.0% 4.3% 6.6% -4.4 (-3.8, 3.0) 
1.2 
(-1.1, 3.4) 
£ED, >PC 31.9% 28.7% 29.1% -1.8 (-9.4, 5.8) 
0.3 
(-5.0, 5.7) 
>ED, £PC 3.7% 8.1% 5.5% 3.6 (-1.0, 8.2) 
0.5 
(-1.9, 2.8) 
£ED, £PC 59.4% 58.9% 58.7% -1.4 (-9.1, 6.4) 
-2.0 
(-7.7, 3.7) 
ED – emergency department, PC – primary care. 
Marginal effects represent a percentage point change in the predicted probability for each substitution outcome 





Table 5. Weighted multinomial logistic regression estimates of year-over-year substitution, 
United States, 2013–2014 
 
Substitution Coefficient (standard error) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome 
categories     
>ED, >PC     
Continuously 





















£ED, >PC     
Continuously 





















>ED, £PC     
Continuously 






















(base outcome) – – – – 
Controls     
Individual-
level   X X X 
County-level    X X 
State fixed 
effects    X 
Number of 
observations 6,435 6,371 6,371 6,371 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Individual-level controls include age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, employment status, marital status, 
household size, household income, presence of a perceived decline in health, and presence of an ambulatory 
care sensitive condition. County-level controls include number of hospitals with an ED (quartiles), number of 
primary care physicians (quartiles), number of physician extenders (quartiles), number of federally qualified 
health centers (quartiles), percentage of population non-white, percentage of population unemployed, 
percentage of population in poverty, percentage of population uninsured, being in a health professional 




Table 6. Sensitivity analysis of year-over-year change in emergency department visits, 
United States, 2013–2014 
 
Change in emergency 
department visits 




 18 to 26 
Drop those 
>400% FPL 
Include with >0 
total visits in both 
years 
Persistence of uninsurance 
prior to 2014     
Continuously insured – – – – 














Number of observations 6,371 5,205 4,147 3,549 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
All models are weighted and include individual- and county-level controls and state fixed effects. 
 
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis of year-over-year change in primary care visits,  
United States, 2013–2014 
 
Change in primary care 
visits 




 18 to 26 
Drop those 
>400% FPL 
Include with >0 
total visits in both 
years 
Persistence of uninsurance 
prior to 2014     
Continuously insured – – – – 














Number of observations 6,371 5,205 4,147 3,549 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 





Table 8. Sensitivity analysis of year-over-year substitution, United States, 2013–2014 
 
Substitution 




 18 to 26a 
Drop those 
>400% FPL 
Include with >0 
total visits in both 
years 
Outcome 
categories     
>ED, >PC     
Continuously 





















£ED, >PC     
Continuously 





















>ED, £PC     
Continuously 






















(base outcome) – – – – 
Number of 
observations 6,371 5,205 4,147 3,549 
a Weighted variance matrix was nonsymmetric, standard errors and p-values not obtained. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 




Table 9. Stratified marginal effects of persistence of uninsurance prior to 2014 













Private Public No Yes No Yes 
ED visits (change in visits) 







































PC visits (change in visits) 







































Substitution (percentage point change in predicted probability) 
>ED, >PC       
Continuously insured – – – – – – 
































£ED, >PC       
Continuously insured – – – – – – 


































>ED, £PC       
Continuously insured – – – – – – 



































£ED, £PC       
Continuously insured – – – – – – 


































Number of observations 6,371 2,762 6,371 
ED – emergency department, PC – primary care. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
a Payer type models also include controls for state Medicaid expansion status, number of Marketplace insurers 






CHAPTER 3: IS THERE A DELAYED EFFECT OF COVERAGE GAINS UNDER  
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON AVOIDABLE ED VISIT RATES? 
 
Introduction 
Potentially avoidable visits to the emergency department are an indication of missed 
opportunities for the health care system and patients—for earlier intervention in disease, 
developing an ongoing relationship with a primary care provider and/or practice, and assessing 
social needs. A study of a single large commercial insurer suggests that care for “low-acuity” 
conditions has shifted away from ED settings (Poon et al., 2018) but it is unclear if this finding is 
generalizable to the wider insured population. Those findings could be driven by changes in plan 
generosity (e.g., increasing deductibles and copayments) or enrollment composition of the single 
national insurer in their study (Aetna), or reflective of an increase in the supply of non-ED care 
settings. 
The effect of coverage expansions on ED use is a separate but related issue because of the 
misperception that the uninsured use the ED at substantially higher rates than the insured and less 
appropriately (Zhou, Baicker, Taubman, & Finkelstein, 2017). The Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment showed a causal effect of gaining public coverage on greater use of the ED (Taubman 
et al., 2014) even though observational evidence from other pre-ACA studies focused on expansion 
and contraction of Medicaid eligibility provide mixed findings (Heavrin et al., 2011; Kolstad & 
Kowalski, 2012; Lowe, McConnell, Vogt, & Smith, 2008; Marton et al., 2012; Ndumele et al., 
2014; Sommers & Simon, 2017).  
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The ACA expanded health insurance coverage in the non-elderly adult population through 
the dependent coverage provision, establishing a health insurance Marketplace with key consumer 
protections, and by expanding Medicaid eligibility. The dependent coverage provision took effect 
in September 2010, six months after the passage of the ACA, allowing young adults to remain on 
their parents’ health insurance plan up to age 26. The Marketplace, as the collection of federally 
and state-run health insurance exchanges is known, provides access to guaranteed issue health 
insurance coverage with premium subsidies available to those between 100% and 400% of the 
federal poverty level, as long as employer-based coverage is not already available. Medicaid 
expansion, if adopted by a state, allows residents with incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level to enroll in Medicaid regardless of failure to meet prior categorical eligibility requirements 
(e.g., pregnant women, parents of young children). 
Previous studies have estimated the population-level effect of coverage gains on ED 
utilization—before the ACA (Gandhi, Grant, & Sabik, 2014), after early Medicaid expansion in 
California (Sabik, Cunningham, & Tehrani, 2017), and after ACA implementation (Nikpay et al., 
2017; Sommers et al., 2016, 2017)—but none has examined both the longer-run trajectory of 
effects or focused on non-emergent ED utilization after the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion. 
We address both gaps in the literature by providing estimates of whether coverage gains yield 
reductions in avoidable ED visits over time. We use two well-known algorithms to identify 
different categories of potentially avoidable visits—preventable and non-emergent ED visits— 
exploring potential delayed effects and spatial correlation using a census of discharge records in 
seven states from before the passage of the ACA to up to three years after the Marketplace and 






Our study uses visit-level hospital discharge data from the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project from seven states over the years from 2008 to 
2016 to capture ED use before and after passage of the ACA. For participating states, HCUP 
provides a census of discharges from inpatient, emergency department, and ambulatory settings 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2018). We obtained both the State Inpatient 
Databases and State Emergency Department Databases for each state-year in the analysis to ensure 
that we were capturing both discharges from the ED and inpatient discharges that originated in the 
ED. Not all states participate in HCUP (either at all, across all databases, or continuously), which 
means that the universe of states suitable for our analysis was limited. Non-participating states 
often have ED discharge data available but information included in non-HCUP discharge 
databases varies considerably. The advantage of HCUP is a high level of standardization of 
measures and coding across state-years. We chose a set of seven geographically and 
demographically diverse states for inclusion: Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New 
Jersey, and North Carolina. As of August 2018, two states had data available from 2008 through 
2015 (Maryland and New Jersey) with the other five through 2016 (Arizona, Florida, Iowa, 
Kentucky, North Carolina), which allows us to capture the first two to three years beyond the 
introduction of the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion in 2014 and several years beyond the 
dependent coverage provision that took effect in late 2010. 
 We focus on the non-elderly adult population (18 to 64 years of age) given the three 
channels of expansion in the ACA noted above. The coverage environments for children and the 
elderly were already significantly different due to the near-universality of Medicare for the elderly 
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and the more generous availability of public coverage for children of lower income families 
through Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. We also use data from the Health 
Resources and Services Administration Area Health Resources Files, Census Bureau Small Area 
Health Insurance Estimates, and Census Bureau County Business Patterns to provide annual 
county-level measures of population, demographics, insurance coverage, and supply of and 
demand for health care (Census Bureau, n.d.-a, n.d.-b; Health Resources and Services 
Administration, n.d.). The Census Bureau TIGER/Line® Shapefiles were used to capture 
contiguity of counties (Census Bureau, 2019). 
Measures 
 The outcome of interest in our study is the county-quarter number of ED visits per 1,000 
non-elderly adults. We calculated this ED visit rate by first restricting the original discharge-level 
data to those aged 18 to 64 who were residents of the state represented by that database (e.g., 
Arizona residents in the Arizona SEDD or SID). Second, visits were aggregated to a county-
quarter total. Finally, the county-quarter rate was calculated using the county-year population for 
this specific age group from the SAHIE. 
The visit rate per 1,000 captures all ED use, which is not a measure that we would 
necessarily expect to be as sensitive to changes in population-level health insurance coverage rates 
as focusing on visits that may be avoidable. We employed two algorithms for ascertaining whether 
each ED visit was potentially avoidable: 1) the ambulatory care sensitive conditions criteria, 
defined in the AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicators Guide, and 2) having a greater than 50% 
probability of being either non-emergent (not needing treatment within 12 hours) or emergent 
(needing treatment within 12 hours) but treatable in primary care, as defined by the New York 
University Emergency Department Algorithm. Both algorithms have been used extensively in 
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prior analyses of avoidable, non-emergent, and/or preventable ED use (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, n.d.; New York University, n.d.). Ambulatory care sensitive conditions are 
those “for which good outpatient care can potentially prevent the need for hospitalization, or for 
which early intervention can prevent complications or more severe disease” (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2001). The developers of the NYU EDA state that “the algorithm 
is not intended as a triage tool or a mechanism to determine whether ED use in a specific case is 
‘appropriate’ (e.g., for reimbursement purposes)” (New York University, n.d.), rather it is a useful 
tool for assessing differences across groups or over time in the proportion of visits that are likely 
to have been preventable or better treated in a different setting.  
The HCUP databases capture diagnoses associated with each ED visit using International 
Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision diagnosis codes through the third quarter of 2015, 
switching to ICD-10 thereafter. The ambulatory care sensitive conditions criteria have been 
specified under both coding systems, and we used the most recent specifications for each, from 
2016 for ICD-9 and 2018 for ICD-10. There was substantial variation in the number of diagnosis 
and procedure codes reported in each state-database-year, ranging as high as 66 diagnosis codes 
and 50 procedure codes. To make the identification of ED visits associated with ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions computationally tractable given the number of total visits included in the study 
(133,175,161), we used only the first 10 diagnosis and procedure codes on each discharge record. 
This limit also helps with consistency across states as some supplied fewer codes than others. We 
used a modified version of the NYU EDA guidelines under both coding systems that reduces the 
number of visits that cannot be probabilistically assigned to one of the four categories of 
emergence and preventability (Johnston, Allen, Melanson, & Pitts, 2017). Similar to the overall 
rate, the total number of visits identified as 1) being for ambulatory care sensitive conditions or 2) 
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having a greater than 50% probability of being either non-emergent or emergent but treatable in 
primary care were summed to the county-quarter level and then converted into a rate per 1,000 
using the same population noted above. This latter criterion has been used as a threshold in prior 
studies using the NYU EDA algorithm (Gandhi & Sabik, 2014). 
We included annual percentage of total population that is not white non-Hispanic, 
percentage of total population in poverty, median household income, and unemployment rate to 
account for variation in county-level demographics over time. Median household income was 
adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. We also included the percentage of the non-elderly adult population insured in 
each county-year to capture changes in population-level insurance coverage over time. The number 
of hospitals, number of federally qualified health centers, and number of physicians (MDs, 
specifically) in general or family practice per 1,000 total population at the county-year level were 
included to account for changes in the supply of health care facilities and providers relevant for 
settings that are substitutes for avoidable ED visits. We capture the prevailing health status and 
demand for health care services in each county-year by deriving the number of inpatient days and 
outpatient visits per 1,000 total population. We also account for county-quarters in which a state 
Medicaid expansion was in effect, which applied to five (Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
New Jersey) of the seven states included in our study beginning in the first quarter of 2014. 
Urgent care centers and retail clinics are not yet captured in AHRF, which is a significant 
limitation in describing the availability of potential substitutes for the ED. However, CBP does 
contain the number of establishments at the county level for this segment of the care environment 
in NAICS code 621498 (other outpatient care centers), our best available proxy for the number of 
retail clinics and/or urgent care centers that is collected consistently over time and geography. 
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These data are only available for a subset of counties and therefore were only used in alternate 
analyses for a restricted set of counties. 
Statistical analysis 
Our identification strategy relies on using within-county variation to estimate the effect of 
changes in population-level health insurance coverage among non-elderly adults with rates of ED 
use. We began with a fixed effects estimator that incorporates the covariates described above in a 
stepwise manner along with county, quarter, and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered 
by state. This naïve approach is limited in that it assumes that the effect of any changes in county-
level health insurance coverage on ED use are immediate and that there are no potential lagged 
effects associated with the time cost of improving health insurance literacy, identifying a primary 
care provider, changing health care utilization habits, or any number of potential mechanisms that 
would explain delayed behavior change. We build upon this model by adding one- (four quarters), 
two- (eight quarters), and three-year (12 quarters) lags of the insurance coverage variable to the 
fixed effects model. This approach allows us to identify whether prior changes in population-level 
insurance coverage affect ED use rates in the current quarter. 
The fixed effects approach relies on within-county variation in covariates and outcomes, 
assuming that counties (by residence of the patient) are effectively independent from one another. 
However, ED use patterns and the supply of and demand for health care services in one county 
could be correlated with those in neighboring counties. Therefore, we also explore spatial 
regression models that incorporate geographic lags, allowing for the outcomes and health care 
supply and demand in bordering counties to factor into the effect estimation (StataCorp, 2017a). 
This approach allows for specification of spatial autoregressive errors but not the same lagged 
independent variable specification as the fixed effects models. Therefore, we do not have an exact 
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spatial regression analogue of the fixed effects model with lagged county-level health insurance 
coverage for comparison. Our analyses were conducted in SAS® 9.4 for Unix, Stata® 14.1 for 
Unix, and Stata® 15.1 for Windows (SAS Institute Inc., 2013; StataCorp, 2015, 2017b). The maps 
were generated using maptile, a user-written package for Stata® (Stepner, 2017). This study was 
approved as exempt by the Non-Biomedical Institutional Review Board at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill (#18-1555). 
Results 
Our analysis uses over 130 million unique ED visits in seven states over the years 2008 
through 2016. We summarize the demographic and socioeconomic variation (Table 10) and the 
rate of ED visits (Table 11) between the included states and over the time. In addition to 
summarizing the rates of ED use, we compare prevalence of visits for ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions and non-emergent or emergent but primary care treatable conditions before and after 
the ICD-10 coding transition in the fourth quarter of 2015. Overall, we find that approximately 
5.1% of ED visits were for ambulatory care sensitive condition, using the AHRQ definitions, and 
48.7% were for non-emergent or emergent but primary care treatable conditions, using the NYU 
algorithm, with variation by state and year. These classifications were not mutually exclusive with 
1.3% of visits categorized as satisfying both criteria, yielding 52.6% that satisfied either. We 
observe an increase in ambulatory care sensitive condition prevalence and decrease in non-
emergent or emergent but primary care treatable condition prevalence associated with the coding 
transition. This divergence in prevalence between the two algorithms may be due to changes in 
provider coding practices associated with the ICD-10 transition, given the large expansion and 
greater specificity of codes available, or with the coding algorithms themselves, despite the effort 
to maintain comparability with the older code set. As such, we have included an indicator for 
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quarters using ICD-10 coding in our regression analyses and have also estimated alternate versions 
using only quarters with ICD-9 coding as robustness checks. 
There is substantial county-level variation in both ED visit rates per 1,000 non-elderly 
adults and the non-elderly adult insured rate in 2008 and over our study period as the ACA took 
effect, which we will exploit to help identify how increased population-level insurance coverage 
affects ED visit rates (Figures 5 through 8). County-level variation in ED visit rates per 1,000 non-
elderly adults for ambulatory care sensitive conditions and non-emergent or emergent but primary 
care treatable conditions in 2008 and over time are also shown (Figures 9 through 12). 
Table 12 shows how the effect of population-level insurance coverage on ED visit rates 
changes as we add controls to our fixed effects model. For total ED visits, a one percentage point 
increase in county-level health insurance coverage among non-elderly adults is associated with 
approximately 0.6 additional ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults per county-quarter. For ED 
visits for an ambulatory care sensitive condition, the effect of a one percentage point increase in 
county-level health insurance coverage among non-elderly adults is consistently associated with 
approximately 0.1 additional ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults per county-quarter. For ED 
visits for non-emergent or emergent but primary care treatable conditions, there is no evidence of 
an effect of changes in population-level insurance coverage on ED visits rates. Table 13 shows our 
estimates when adding one- (four quarters), two- (eight quarters), and three-year lags (twelve 
quarters) of population-level insurance coverage to our full model (Model 4 from Table 12). For 
total ED visits, the contemporaneous effect estimate falls slightly to 0.44 additional ED visits per 
1,000 non-elderly adults per percentage point increase in coverage (95% CI: 0.08, 0.79, p<0.05) 
with all three lagged terms having no effect. For ED visits for ambulatory care sensitive conditions, 
the contemporaneous effect estimate falls by approximately half to 0.07 additional ED visits per 
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1,000 non-elderly adults for each percentage point increase in coverage (95% CI: 0.03, 0.11, 
p<0.01) with only the two-year lag term being statistically significant (b=0.07, 95% CI: 0.01, 0.13, 
p<0.05). Only the one-year lag term was statistically significant for ED visits for non-emergent or 
emergent but primary care treatable conditions, showing a slight decline in visits (b=-0.11, 95% 
CI: -0.21, 0.00, p<0.05) associated with a one percentage point increase in coverage four quarters 
prior. Medicaid expansion was associated with significant reductions in all three ED visit rates: 
total ED visits (b=-4.84, 95% CI: -8.62, -1.06, p<0.05), ED visits for ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions (b=-0.56, 95% CI: -1.06, -0.06, p<0.05), and ED visits for non-emergent or emergent 
but primary care treatable conditions (b=-2.99, 95% CI: -5.10, -0.89, p<0.05). 
We ran robustness checks to assess how our results were affected by the ICD-10 coding 
transition and inclusion of a proxy for urgent care center availability. After dropping all quarters 
after the ICD-10 transition in the ED discharge data (quarter 4 of 2015 and beyond), there are no 
significant contemporaneous or lagged effects of population-level coverage gains on any of our 
three ED visit rate outcomes in the fixed effects models (Table 14). Our proxy for urgent care 
center availability (number of “other outpatient centers” per 1,000 population) was only available 
for a subset of counties (306 out of 446 included in the full analysis) so the results are not directly 
comparable to our main findings; however, we also ran the main models on this subsample for 
comparison (Table 15). For total ED visits, the contemporaneous effect estimate is 0.60 additional 
ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults per percentage point increase in coverage (95% CI: 0.26, 
0.94, p<0.01) with all three lagged terms having no effect. For ED visits for ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions, the contemporaneous effect estimate is 0.06 additional ED visits per 1,000 
non-elderly adults for each percentage point increase in coverage (95% CI: 0.04, 0.09, p<0.01) and 
the one-year lagged effect is 0.07 additional ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults (95% CI: 0.01, 
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0.13, p<0.05) with the two- and three-year lags having no effect. For ED visits for non-emergent 
or emergent but primary care treatable conditions, the one-year lagged effect is -0.18 ED visits per 
1,000 non-elderly adults (95% CI: -0.26, -0.10, p<0.01) with the contemporaneous term and the 
two- and three-year lags having no effect. As shown for comparison, inclusion of urgent care 
centers in the model does not meaningfully affect our effect estimates in the relevant subsample. 
Table 16 contains our spatial regression results using a first-order contiguous spatial lag 
(neighboring counties). For lags of the dependent variable only or the dependent variable and the 
independent variables capturing health care supply and demand, the results are fairly consistent 
across our ED visit rates outcomes with approximately 0.6 to 0.7 additional ED visits per 1,000 
non-elderly adults in a county-quarter for each percentage point increase in population-level health 
insurance coverage. However, the effect of coverage becomes negative for total ED visits (b=-
0.45, 95% CI: -0.51, -0.39, p<0.01) and ED visits for non-emergent or emergent but primary care 
treatable conditions (b=-0.42, 95% CI: -0.49, -0.36, p<0.01) when spatial autoregressive errors are 
included. The effect for ED visits for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (b=0.93, 95% CI: 0.92, 
0.94, p<0.01) remains significant and increases in magnitude. If we again drop the quarters after 
the ICD-10 transition, all of the effects remain significant but slightly attenuated with a similar 
pattern of changes when the spatial autoregressive errors are included (Table 17). We were not 
able to estimate our spatial regression models with our proxy for urgent care center supply given 
the reduced number of counties and lack of appropriate contiguity in the panel. 
Discussion 
 Our analysis used a variety of modeling approaches to show that increases in population-
level health insurance coverage are not enough on their own to yield reductions in potentially 
avoidable ED visits. However, Medicaid expansion was associated with reductions in both the 
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total and potentially avoidable ED visit rates, indicating that the type of coverage gained matters. 
We also find that geography matters, as there is spatial correlation in ED visit rates across county 
lines with the supply and demand for health care in neighboring counties playing a role in ED use.  
The question of what makes an ED visit inappropriate or avoidable is complex and highly 
controversial. Several insurers have implemented post-hoc review of ED visit claims in recent 
years that seemingly violate the prudent layperson standard for emergency coverage (Trueger, 
2018), denying coverage based on reported diagnoses rather than presenting symptoms. The 
sensitivity and specificity of methods for classifying appropriateness of an ED visit is fraught with 
problems as the severity of the potential diagnoses underlying a single presenting compliant can 
be highly variable (Raven, Lowe, Maselli, & Hsia, 2013). A wide range of estimates exist for the 
proportion of ED use attributable to non-emergent care—ranging from as low as 8% of visits to 
62% (Uscher-Pines et al., 2013; Weinick, Burns, & Mehrotra, 2010).  
All health insurance coverage is not created equal. There is substantial variation in benefit 
design across insurance types, with Medicaid having little to no cost sharing and commercial plans 
through the Marketplace often having high deductibles and substantial coinsurance. Simply 
enrolling more people is not on its own going to change health behaviors, result in more efficient 
use of services and settings, or improve population health, particularly when being insured does 
not necessarily make using health care affordable (e.g., very high spending thresholds before 
reaching stated actuarial value in Marketplace plans) (Polyakova, Hua, & Bundorf, 2017). It takes 
time to develop a trusting relationship with a provider and gaining coverage alone does not remove 
all access barriers or ensure receipt of high-quality care (H. Allen et al., 2014). Coverage 
expansions can certainly play a large role in aligning incentives and reducing uncompensated care 
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for health systems, but expecting substantial short-term reductions in health care use and costs may 
be overly optimistic. 
Our study has several limitations. We are interested in understanding the impact of 
insurance changes on ED visits that could potentially be avoided, though there is not a single 
straightforward method for identifying such visits. Thus, we use two commonly used algorithms 
that identify different types of visits that are potentially avoidable. We found a sizable difference 
in the percentage of ED visits identified by the AHRQ and NYU algorithms, with the former 
identifying ED visits that were likely preventable with better primary care and the latter capturing 
the likelihood that a visit did not require treatment in the ED. For these algorithms, we observed 
different effects of the ICD-10 transition (percentage of visits for ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions going up, percentage of visits for non-emergent or emergent but primary care treatable 
conditions going down). Also, the length of time that we observe after the Marketplace and 
Medicaid expansion took effect in 2014 is limited to two or three years based on the state. 
However, by using a long period of time prior to 2014, we aimed to establish a strong pre-ACA 
trend and also capture variation in the uninsured rate introduced by the dependent coverage 
provision that took effect in late 2010 shortly after passage of the law. Our fixed effects models 
exploit within-county variation in ED visit rates and population-level insurance coverage by 
accounting for time-invariant differences between counties. We attempted to address changes in 
the underlying population characteristics and health care market within each county, but it is 
possible that other factors that we could not control for also play a role in this relationship. These 
findings may not generalize to all states and/or future coverage expansions based on the 
characteristics of those settings (e.g., prevailing insured rate, practice patterns, health care supply 
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and demand) and the benefit design of the coverage gained by those newly enrolled (Sommers & 
Simon, 2017). 
 It is also unclear that expanding the supply of ED substitutes for non-emergent conditions 
is a solution either. Greater access to community health centers, retail clinics, and urgent care 
centers should allow for declines in ED visit rates over time as people learn about and use these 
settings, as recent studies have shown (Alexander et al., 2017; L. Allen, Cummings, & 
Hockenberry, 2019). However, these encouraging findings contradict other studies showing that 
penetration of retail clinics either does not meaningfully affect ED use for “low-acuity” conditions 
nor does it reduce overall health care spending (Ashwood et al., 2016; Martsolf et al., 2017). 
Beyond insurance coverage, policymakers may need to turn to alternative models of care or 
payment models combined with increased attention to social determinants of health in order to 
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Figure 7. Change in average quarterly ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults by county for 




Note: Maryland and New Jersey are shown as missing because data for those two states were only available through 











Figure 9. Average quarterly ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults for ambulatory care 






Figure 10. Average quarterly ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults for non-emergent or 





Figure 11. Change in average quarterly ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults for 




Note: Maryland and New Jersey are shown as missing because data for those two states were only available through 
2015 as of August 2018.
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Figure 12. Change in average quarterly ED visits per 1,000 non-elderly adults for non-
emergent or emergent but primary care treatable conditions by county for included states, 




Note: Maryland and New Jersey are shown as missing because data for those two states were only available through 




Table 10. State demographic characteristics, 2008 and 2016 
State Number of counties 
Non-elderly adult 
population (in 1000s) 
Total population 
(in 1000s) 
% non-white and/or 
Hispanic % in poverty Unemployment rate 
2008 2016 (% change) 2008 
2016 
(% change) 2008 
2016 










































































Table 11. ED visit volumes and classification for non-elderly adults by state 
State 
2008 (quarterly average) –  
ICD-9 
2015 (quarterly average,  
quarters 1 through 3) – ICD-9 
2015 (quarter 4) –  
ICD-10 
2016 (quarterly average) – 
ICD-10 





















































































(43.6%) – – – 

























(58.6%) – – – 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care treatable conditions (NYU) 





Table 12. Fixed effect estimates of the contemporaneous effect of changes in county-level insurance coverage on ED visit rates, 




(95% confidence interval) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 










ACSC ED visits per 









NEPCT ED visits per 









County fixed effects 
and ICD-10 X X X X 
Quarter and year  
fixed effects X X X X 
Medicaid expansion  X X X 
Demographics and 
socioeconomic factors   X X 
Health care supply  
and demand    X 
N (county-quarters) 15,876 15,876 15,876 15,876 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care treatable conditions (NYU) 
Each cell is a separate model. Standard errors are clustered by state. Demographics and socioeconomic factors include percentage of population non-white or 
Hispanic, real median household income, percentage of population in poverty, and unemployment rate. Health care supply and demand includes number of 
hospitals per 1,000 total population, number of FQHCs per 1,000 total population, number of physicians in general or family practice per 1,000 total population, 







Table 13. Fixed effect estimates of the lagged effect of changes in county-level insurance 




(95% confidence interval) 
ED visits per 1,000  
non-elderly adults 
ACSC ED visits per 
1,000 non-elderly adults 
NEPCT ED visits per 
1,000 non-elderly adults 
Lag of quarterly  
insured rate    

























N (county-quarters) 10,524 10,524 10,524 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care 
treatable conditions (NYU) 
Each column is a separate model. These models include the full set of controls as shown in Model 4 of Table 12 
(county, quarter, and year fixed effects, ICD-10 indicator, Medicaid expansion indicator, demographic and 





Table 14. Fixed effect estimates of the lagged effect of changes in county-level insurance 
coverage on ED visit rates, 2008 to quarter 3 of 2015 
 
Lag of quarterly insured 
rate 
Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
ED visits per 1,000  
non-elderly adults 
ACSC ED visits per 
1,000  
non-elderly adults 
NEPCT ED visits per 
1,000  
non-elderly adults 




















N (county-quarters) 8,474 8,474 8,474 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care 
treatable conditions (NYU) 
Each column is a separate model. These models include the full set of controls as shown in Model 4 of Table 12 
(county, quarter, and year fixed effects, Medicaid expansion indicator, demographic and socioeconomic factors, and 





Table 15. Fixed effect estimates of the lagged effect of changes in county-level  
insurance coverage on ED visit rates, including urgent care centers, 2008 to 2016 
 
Lag of quarterly insured 
rate 
Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
ED visits per 1,000  
non-elderly adults 
ACSC ED visits per 
1,000  
non-elderly adults 
NEPCT ED visits per 
1,000  
non-elderly adults 
With urgent care centers    




















Same subsample but without 
urgent care centers    




















N (county-quarters) 6,040 6,040 6,040 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care 
treatable conditions (NYU) 
Each column-panel is a separate model. These models include the full set of controls as shown in Model 4 of Table 
12 (county, quarter, and year fixed effects, ICD-10 indicator, Medicaid expansion indicator, demographic and 
socioeconomic factors, and health care demand and supply) plus the number of ‘other outpatient care centers’ 




Table 16. Spatial regression estimates of the contemporaneous effect of changes  
in county-level insurance coverage on ED visit rates, 2008 to 2016 
 
Spatial lags used 
Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
ED visits per 1,000  
non-elderly adults 
ACSC ED visits per 
1,000 non-elderly adults 
NEPCT ED visits per 
1,000 non-elderly adults 





Dependent variable and 
selected independent 
variables (health care 









variables (health care 








N (county-quarters) 14,272 14,272 14,272 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care 
treatable conditions (NYU) 
Each cell is a separate model. These models include the full set of controls as shown in Model 4 of Table 12 
(county, quarter, and year fixed effects, ICD-10 indicator, Medicaid expansion indicator, demographic and 
socioeconomic factors, and health care demand and supply). These estimates use a first-order spatial lag 




Table 17. Spatial regression estimates of the contemporaneous effect of changes  
in county-level insurance coverage on ED visit rates, 2008 to quarter 3 of 2015 
 
Spatial lags used 
Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
ED visits per 1,000  
non-elderly adults 
ACSC ED visits per 
1,000  
non-elderly adults 
NEPCT ED visits per 
1,000  
non-elderly adults 






Dependent variable and 
selected independent 
variables (health care 









variables (health care 








N (county-quarters) 13,826 13,826 13,826 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
ACSC – ambulatory care sensitive conditions (AHRQ), NEPCT – non-emergent or emergent but primary care 
treatable conditions (NYU) 
Each cell is a separate model. These models include the full set of controls as shown in Model 4 of Table 12 
(county, quarter, and year fixed effects, Medicaid expansion indicator, demographic and socioeconomic factors, and 
health care demand and supply) except for the ICD-10 indicator. These estimates use a first-order spatial lag 






CHAPTER 4: DO HIGH DEDUCTIBLES REDUCE THE USE OF ‘FREE’ 
PREVENTIVE SERVICES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT? 
Introduction 
Less than one-tenth of adults in the United States aged 35 and older are up-to-date with all 
recommended preventive services, falling well short of many Healthy People 2020 goals, a set of 
national health promotion targets (Borsky et al., 2018; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2015; Healthy People 2020, n.d.). Prevention is often incentivized in alternative payment models 
because of its perception as a cost-effective way to improve population health. The economic 
benefits of providing a particular preventive service to a large population depends on its ability to 
reduce aggregate medical expenditures, or at least reduce their growth rate, in the long run (Carroll, 
2018). This is, of course, a separate matter from the desire to reduce disease burden and improve 
health broadly in the population. The number needed to screen or treat to effectively reduce 
morbidity and mortality burden through prevention can vary widely across conditions, risk 
profiles, and transmission potential (Hashim, Dang, Bolotin, & Crowcroft, 2015; Kristiansen & 
Gyrd-Hansen, 2004; Rossignol, Labrecque, Cauchon, Breton, & Poirier, 2018; Taylor, Huffman, 
& Ebrahim, 2013; Tuite & Fisman, 2013). 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 sought to increase use of 
preventive services by eliminating cost sharing to consumers, making eligible services exempt 
from plan deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
2010). Specifically, the ACA required all new and “substantially” modified commercial health 
insurance plans sold after September 23, 2010 (referred to as non-grandfathered plans) to cover 
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certain high-value preventive services with no out-of-pocket cost to consumers (healthcare.gov, 
n.d.). Grandfathered plans, or plans originally sold before this date that did not “substantially cut 
benefits or increase plan costs” were not subject to this requirement, though many such plans 
already included, or were amended to include, first dollar coverage for some preventive services 
nonetheless (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015b; UnitedHealthcare, 2018). 
High deductible health plans require consumers to pay first dollar for their medical 
expenses up to a certain amount and we know that they tend to result in lower use of preventive 
services (Agarwal, Mazurenko, & Menachemi, 2017; Beeuwkes Buntin, Haviland, McDevitt, & 
Sood, 2011; Mazurenko, Buntin, & Menachemi, 2018). In 2010, the minimum qualifying 
deductible and out-of-pocket maximum per Internal Revenue Service guidelines were $1,200 and 
$5,950, respectively, for self-only coverage and twice that for spousal or family coverage. HDHPs 
have grown to make up more than one-third of the commercial health insurance market (29% of 
employer-sponsored and 39% of total enrollment) in 2016 (Cohen, Zammitti, & Martinez, 2018; 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016a). The majority of enrollees in the ACA exchanges are in HDHPs 
with large cost sharing responsibilities before their plans actually meet their stated actuarial values 
(Dolan, 2016; Polyakova et al., 2017). 
HDHPs are generally observed to decrease utilization of both high and low value health 
care services and do not meet the goal of promoting more engaged consumer behavior (e.g., 
shopping around) (Agarwal et al., 2017; Aron-Dine, Einav, & Finkelstein, 2013; Beeuwkes Buntin 
et al., 2011; Brot-Goldberg, Chandra, Handel, & Kolstad, 2017; Gupta & Polsky, 2015; Kullgren 
et al., 2018; Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 2004; Sinaiko, Mehrotra, & Sood, 2016; Waters, 
Chang, Cecil, Kasteridis, & Mirvis, 2011). Theoretically, if consumers were able to discriminate 
between low- and high-value care in reducing their health care use, then HDHPs would be an 
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effective remedy against moral hazard (Einav, Finkelstein, Ryan, Schrimpf, & Cullen, 2013). 
However, consumers often cannot easily assess the value of different treatment options and instead 
delay or forego both high and low-value care (Agarwal et al., 2017; Galbraith et al., 2012; 
Newhouse, 2004; Reid, Rabideau, & Sood, 2017; Wharam et al., 2018). 
Though the elimination of cost sharing for preventive services affected all non-
grandfathered plans, there are several reasons to believe that enrollment in an HDHP may dull the 
response of consumers to a more nuanced benefit such as this. First, consumer understanding of 
health insurance terminology and benefit design is fairly poor, so the ACA provision to increase 
use of preventive services by eliminating cost sharing could get lost in more salient plan features, 
like deductibles (Politi et al., 2014; Reed, Benedetti, Brand, Newhouse, & Hsu, 2009; Reed, 
Graetz, Fung, Newhouse, & Hsu, 2012), or in a lack of awareness of the benefit (Tipirneni et al., 
2018). Second, even if consumers know that certain preventive services will not be subject to cost 
sharing, they may not correctly anticipate costs associated with the preventive service (e.g., 
diagnostic or treatment costs that are not exempt from cost sharing) or the benefits of knowing 
their risk or disease status, which are critical to making well-informed decisions (Binder & 
Nuscheler, 2017; Robinson & Hammitt, 2016). Further, cost constraints for patients may arise 
through an inability to afford the subsequent diagnostics and treatment as a result of preventive 
services, creating budgetary tensions between preventive services. 
Prior studies have assessed how the ACA provision to eliminate cost sharing has affected 
preventive service use for specific services or types of services, finding mixed results (Eisenberg, 
Haviland, Mehrotra, Huckfeldt, & Sood, 2017; Fedewa et al., 2015; Han, Yabroff, Guy, Zheng, & 
Jemal, 2015; Mehta et al., 2015; Sabik & Adunlin, 2017; Wharam et al., 2016). In this study, we 
focus on the question of whether HDHP enrollment is associated with a differential response in 
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the use of covered preventive services generally, another notable gap in the literature (Mazurenko, 
Buntin, et al., 2018). We use a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences approach to observe 
whether those continuously enrolled in HDHPs have a lower probability of using preventive 
services after the policy change than their counterparts in non-HDHPs. Our results provide insight 
into whether HDHPs limit the effectiveness of first-dollar coverage for preventive services in 
achieving the goal of increased use. 
Methods 
Data 
This study uses a 1% random sample of commercial health insurance billing claims from 
the IBM® MarketScan® Commercial Database for the years 2008 through 2016. These data 
represent a national multi-payer set of commercially enrolled individuals, including tens of 
millions of covered lives in each year who are enrolled in either employer-sponsored or non-group 
health insurance plans (IBM Watson Health, 2017). MarketScan® data includes self-insured 
employers, third party administrators, and health insurers, providing one of the largest samples of 
privately insured individuals in the United States. 
We restricted the data to enrollment and claims for non-elderly adults (18 to 64 years of 
age) who were enrolled for the full plan year (at least 360 days) to observe use of preventive 
services or the type of other coverage held (e.g., health maintenance organization, preferred 
provider organization, HDHP). Over 70% of age-eligible enrollees (71.2%) met this inclusion 
criterion during the study period. We chose not to include children as they do not make health care 
decisions independently and are subject to varying requirements for immunizations and other 
preventive services for school entry at the state and/or local levels that may attenuate any effect of 
the reduction in out-of-pocket costs (e.g., potential ceiling effects) (Hedden, Jessop, & Field, 2014; 
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Shaw et al., 2018). We also excluded the population of adults aged 65 and older as Medicare was 
not subject to this provision. Another inclusion criterion was consistency of plan type within the 
calendar year to ensure that the benefit design and other coverage characteristics (i.e., network, 
gatekeeping) were held constant. Nearly 95% of person-years (94.8%) meeting the age and plan 
days criteria maintained a consistent plan type within the plan year. In total, more than two-thirds 
of age-eligible person-years (67.5%) in the MarketScan® data for the years 2008 through 2016 
met all of these inclusion criteria. 
We created two samples from the MarketScan® annual enrollment files for use in this 
analysis, a cross-sectional and a cohort sample. The cross-sectional sample is used to describe 
trends in preventive service utilization and expenditures over the years 2008 through 2016. Each 
person-year meeting the inclusion criteria was retained, yielding a sample with more than 1.8 
million person-years (n=1,857,172). Some individuals had multiple years of data while others may 
only appear for a single plan year.  
The cohort sample focuses on the time period surrounding the exogenous price change, the 
elimination of cost sharing for certain high-value preventive services in late 2010, by requiring 
continuous enrollment across 2010 and 2011. The elimination of cost sharing technically took 
effect on September 23, 2010 though it only would have been immediately valid for new or 
substantially modified plans sold after that date, which would not apply to anyone in our 
continuously enrolled cohort sample until the 2011 plan year at the earliest. For the cohort sample, 
the plan consistency criterion was extended to cover both utilization years (2010 and 2011) rather 
than only each plan year individually. Of those age-eligible and enrolled for the full plan years in 
2010 and 2011, nearly all (94.0%) had a consistent plan type across both years. We also require 
additional continuous enrollment for a 6-month look-back period to quantify comorbidity burden 
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prior to observing preventive service use, yielding a sample of over ninety thousand enrollees 
(n=93,176) with which to estimate whether the utilization response to this policy change was 
affected by enrollment in a HDHP. We also created a subsample with three years of continuous 
enrollment (36 months total) with which to construct a 12-month comorbidity look-back period 
for comparison with the 6-month measure, yielding a subsample of just under ninety thousand 
enrollees (n=88,284). 
Measures 
Prior studies have tended to focus on a single or narrow set of preventive services that were 
subject to the elimination of cost sharing under the Affordable Care Act. Our goal was to be as 
inclusive as possible among eligible services relevant to the non-elderly adult population, focusing 
on any use and use of specific categories of preventive services. Eligible services were identified 
and grouped into categories similar to those defined by the Kaiser Family Foundation (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2015b), yielding five categories of preventive services use: 1) health 
promotion, 2) cancer, 3) chronic conditions, 4) immunizations, and 5) reproductive health and 
pregnancy (Tables 18 and 19). Several reproductive health services, such as contraception, 
breastfeeding supports, and gestational diabetes screenings, were not covered without cost sharing 
until August 2012 and therefore are not included in our analysis. Medications or supplements that 
are also available over the counter (e.g., aspirin, folic acid) were not included because they would 
not require a prescription and would not be observed in pharmacy claims. 
Eligible preventive services were identified using the MarketScan® annual outpatient 
services files. Each outpatient service claim has up to four diagnosis codes and a single procedure 
code associated with it, all of which were used to identify relevant services. We obtained 
preventive service coding guidelines from UnitedHealthcare, Cigna, Kaiser Permanente (of 
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Washington), Blue Cross Blue Shield (of North Dakota), and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, which were used to identify the specific underlying preventive services using both 
diagnosis (ICD-9 and ICD-10) and procedure (CPT and HCPCS) codes (Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of North Dakota, 2014; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014; Cigna, 2015; Kaiser 
Permanente Washington, n.d.; UnitedHealthcare, 2018). A harmonized code set from all five 
sources was developed and used to identify preventive services potentially eligible for elimination 
of cost sharing with individual claims flagged as an enrollee having received the service if at least 
one applicable diagnosis and procedure code were listed (Table 20). We excluded preventive 
services that took place during an emergency department visit or inpatient admission as we were 
seeking to identify preventive services used in a primary care or outpatient clinic setting, not those 
incidental to an acute event where patients may not be making utilization decisions themselves. 
We also identified and aggregated expenditures for eligible preventive services to the person-year 
level, capturing out-of-pocket costs for these services, by summing across the eligible preventive 
service claims within a given enrollee-year. 
HDHP enrollment is defined as an indicator equal to one if the plan type corresponds to 
either a high deductible plan without a saving option or a consumer-driven health plan, also often 
referred to as a consumer-directed health plan, and zero otherwise (EPO, HMO, POS, or PPO plan 
types). Consumer-driven health plans are high deductible plans that also include a savings option, 
like a health savings account (where employees and/or employers can contribute and the funds are 
portable) or health reimbursement arrangement (where only employers can contribute and the 
funds are generally not portable). Insurer-specific plan type coding is mapped to a standard set of 
plan types in MarketScan® with no specific threshold or criteria provided for what is considered 
to be a high deductible in each plan year. Those with plan types of “basic/major medical”, 
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“comprehensive”, and “POS with capitation” were excluded, comprising approximately 3% of 
both the person-years in the cross-sectional sample and persons in the cohort sample. 
Our models include controls for demographic characteristics, including a cubic spline of 
age (age, age squared, and age cubed each interacted with indicators for being aged 35 to 49 and 
50 to 64), sex, relationship to policy holder (self, spouse, dependent), employment status of policy 
holder (full-time, part-time, other or unknown), employment classification of policy holder (salary, 
hourly, other or unknown), and geographic location, including living in a metropolitan statistical 
area and state fixed effects. Those with missing state identifiers and those who moved states were 
excluded (less than 1% of enrollees). We accounted for prior health status by deriving several 
measures of comorbidity burden, using diagnoses observed in either inpatient or outpatient service 
claims in 2009. We calculated both Charlson (17 underlying conditions) and Elixhauser (31 
underlying conditions) comorbidity indices and defined indicators for the underlying conditions 
within each index (Quan et al., 2005; van Walraven, Austin, Jennings, Quan, & Forster, 2009). 
We tested the performance of both indices and sets of condition indicators with our sample, finding 
that using the set of Elixhauser condition indicators provided the greatest explanatory power. We 
also calculated the number of inpatient admissions and number of prescriptions (unique number 
of generic drug names) in each person-year to capture contemporaneous changes in health status. 
We also control for the source of the underlying data, from either an employer or health plan. 
Statistical analysis 
Using the cross-sectional sample, we first described the trend in HDHP enrollment over 
the study period. We then compared trends in utilization of and average annual per capita 
expenditures (out-of-pocket and total) for eligible preventive services by plan type (HDHP or not). 
We inflated nominal dollar values to 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for Medical 
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Care. Using the cohort sample, we estimated difference-in-differences models to isolate whether 
those enrolled in HDHPs exhibit a differential utilization response to the elimination of cost 
sharing for certain high-value preventive services in late 2010. 
We used both parametric and semi-parametric difference-in-differences models to estimate 
the average treatment effect on the treated, the differential change in utilization of preventive 
services in 2011 among those continuously enrolled in a HDHP from 2009 through 2011. We also 
explored whether heterogeneous treatment effects were present by sex and tertiles of the 
Elixhauser comorbidity index. The full cohort sample was used to model any use of a preventive 
service and category-specific use, based on the five categories noted above, while the appropriate 
subsamples were used to estimate service-level use (as specified in Table 18). The parametric 
difference-in-differences model assumes parallel counterfactual trends between the treatment and 
control groups, which can be difficult to justify empirically and theoretically, particularly when 
endogenous selection into treatment occurs as it does in this setting. Those choosing to enroll in 
and remain in HDHPs, given the option, have varying reasons for doing so. Income plays a role, 
as those of higher income may be willing to bear the risk of reaching the out-of-pocket maximum 
and those of low income are willing (or forced by their budget constraint) to risk higher potential 
out-of-pocket costs in exchange for lower premiums. Health status and expected utilization also 
play a role, as both those who expect costs well above the out-of-pocket maximum and those who 
expect very low costs may be incentivized to choose the lower premiums that generally accompany 
HDHPs (Dowd, Feldman, Cassou, & Finch, 1991; Einav et al., 2013; Fowles, Kind, Braun, & 
Bertko, 2004; Parente, Feldman, & Christianson, 2004). Claims data provide few observable 
characteristics with which to explicitly model this selection into the treatment. We also do not 
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observe the set of health insurance plan options available to each enrollee that could be used to 
identify whether an enrollee is choosing a HDHP or if it is their only option.  
As such, a next best approach is to employ a semi-parametric difference-in-differences 
estimator, such as the one developed by Abadie, which uses a propensity score for the probability 
of treatment to reweight observations based on the distribution of the observable characteristics at 
baseline within each group (Abadie, 2005; Houngbedji, 2016a). The parametric model is identified 
off of the assumption that “average outcomes for treated and controls would have followed parallel 
paths in absence of treatment” and that selection into treatment is not dependent on “individual-
transitory shocks” (Abadie, 2005), which may not be plausible when selection into endogenous 
treatment is occurring. The semi-parametric approach imposes the same distribution of 
observables across groups and thus relaxes the strong parallel trends assumption with quasi-
random treatment by explicitly accounting for selection into treatment. The weights derived and 
used by the Abadie estimator are somewhat different from standard propensity score-based inverse 
probability of treatment weights and the estimation explicitly relies on the within-person change 
in outcome rather than treating it as a two-period cross-section or panel (Abadie, 2005; 
Houngbedji, 2016a). SDID also treats the propensity scores as estimated rather than assuming they 
are given, which can result in artificially small standard errors (Houngbedji, 2016a). 
Recent work has highlighted issues with matching methods used with difference-in-
difference estimators and notes that parallel pre-trends alone are not sufficient to assume success 
(Daw & Hatfield, 2018a, 2018b; Lindner & McConnell, 2018). However, unlike propensity score 
matching approaches, the Abadie estimator reweights observations rather than performing explicit 
matches of observations between groups. It is unclear that these critiques apply to this method as 
such; however, they still bear consideration. Daw and Hatfield are concerned with regression to 
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the mean directly influencing the amount of bias introduced by matching based on 1) differences 
in the relative magnitude of extreme values across groups and 2) correlation between the matching 
variable and the post-period outcome (Daw & Hatfield, 2018a). The first is less of a concern in 
this context because this is essentially a modified linear probability model, a binary outcome 
eliminates any concerns about differences in extreme values across groups driving any effects. For 
completeness, we present both the DID and SDID results. 
The MarketScan® annual enrollment files and inpatient, outpatient, and pharmacy claims 
data were processed using SAS® 9.4 for Linux and analyses were subsequently conducted in 
Stata® 13.0 for Linux. The Abadie semi-parametric difference-in-differences models were 
estimated using the user-written absdid package for Stata® (Houngbedji, 2016b) with the sle 
(logistic regression) option specified to force the propensity scores to be bounded between 0 and 
1. We modified the program to output the propensity scores generated using our preferred 
specification to test for covariate balance between the reweighted treatment (HDHP) and control 
(non-HDHP) groups. P-values for the regression models were adjusted using a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons. This study was approved as exempt by the Non-Biomedical 
Institutional Review Board at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (#18-0379). 
Results 
Cross-sectional sample 
In our cross-sectional sample, consisting of nearly 2 million person-years (n=1,857,172), 
HDHP enrollment rose steadily from 2.8% in 2008 to 21.8% in 2016. Those enrolled in a HDHP 
were approximately one year younger on average (41.3 versus 42.2) and female representation was 
approximately one percentage point lower (51.7% versus 52.6%). Policy holders (60.7% versus 
62.4%) were less prevalent and dependents (12.5% versus 11.1%) were more prevalent in HDHPs. 
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Part-time employment (of the policy holder) representation in HDHPs was low but approximately 
double that of non-HDHPs (1.6% versus 0.8%).  Hourly paid employment (of the policy holder) 
was more prevalent in the HDHP group (18.8% versus 14.9%). HDHP enrollees were also more 
likely to live in a metropolitan statistical area (86.3% versus 84.5%). 
Use of any of the preventive services that were potentially covered under the Affordable 
Care Act cost sharing provision increased from 2008 to 2016 (Figure 13). Those in HDHPs had 
lower utilization rates than those in non-HDHPs at the beginning (56.9% versus 59.0%) and end 
(62.2% versus 63.7%) of the study period with the difference in use between the groups narrowing 
somewhat from 2008 (2.1 percentage points lower) to 2016 (1.5 percentage points lower). 
Similarly, real average annual per capita total (Figure 14) and out-of-pocket costs (Figure 15) 
incurred for potentially covered preventive services also increased during this time period. HDHP 
enrollees incurred lower real average annual per capita total costs for potentially covered 
preventive services initially ($420.61 versus $511.72 in 2008) than those not in a HDHP and the 
difference was nearly the same by the end of the study period ($620.15 versus $707.87 in 2016). 
The groups incurred very similar out-of-pocket costs initially ($62.08 for HDHP and $66.53 for 
non-HDHP in 2008) but cost sharing grew faster for the HDHP group ($104.59 versus $80.50 in 
2016). These results show that at a population level, any use of potentially covered preventive 
services increased during this time period with a corresponding increasing trend in total 
expenditures. There were no obvious changes in utilization or total expenditures coincidental with 
the timing of the policy change in late 2010. Our conclusions about the effect, or lack thereof, on 
total or out-of-pocket costs for preventive services do not qualitatively change if we condition on 
any use of a preventive service. However, inference is limited due to the cross-sectional design 




In our cohort sample, consisting of 93,176 continuously enrolled non-elderly adults during 
the latter half of 2009 through 2011, approximately 6% (6.4%) were enrolled in HDHPs in 2010. 
This is similar to the prevalence of HDHP enrollment in the cross-sectional sample during these 
years (7.9% in 2010 and 8.2% in 2011), but, not surprisingly, slightly lower owing to the 
continuous enrollment requirements that bias the sample towards non-high deductible employer 
sponsored coverage as a result of lower churn in group versus non-group coverage (Klein, Glied, 
& Ferry, 2005). Table 21 contains unweighted and weighted baseline (2010) descriptive statistics 
for the cohort sample by HDHP enrollment, using inverse probability of treatment weights derived 
from the propensity scores estimated for the SDID model. In the unweighted results, the average 
age and distribution of sex were not significantly different across groups. Spouses were present at 
a higher percentage in the HDHP group (30.5% versus 28.4%, p<0.01), indicating that spousal and 
family coverage may be slightly more prevalent in that group. Part-time employment (of the policy 
holder) representation in HDHPs was more than fourfold that of non-HDHPs (3.0% versus 0.7%, 
p<0.01). Hourly paid employment (of the policy holder) was slightly overrepresented in the HDHP 
group (17.2% versus 16.5%, p<0.05) with the caveat of a large other or unknown group. HDHP 
enrollees were less likely to live in a metropolitan statistical area (85.0% versus 86.2%, p<0.05). 
HDHP enrollees used slightly more unique prescriptions (11.5 versus 10.9, p<0.05) along with 
using slightly fewer inpatient admissions on average (0.05 versus 0.06, p<0.01), but had a similar 
Elixhauser comorbidity index. From this, we observe weakly mixed to null evidence of possible 
advantageous selection (better health) into HDHPs on average but also that price sensitivity on 
premium costs may be driving selection (i.e., higher spousal representation and part-time 
employment). In comparing the performance of 6- and 12-month Elixhauser comorbidity indices 
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in the subsample with both available, we find a wider and statistically significant gap between the 
HDHP (0.41) and non-HDHP (0.47) groups that maintains the same rank order of the 6-month 
measure (0.28 for HDHP and 0.30 for non-HDHP, not significantly different), again indicating 
potentially weakly healthier individuals on average sorting into the HDHP group. After propensity 
score weighting, the differences in distributions of relationship to policy holder, employment 
classification of policy holder, and number of inpatient admissions were no longer significant 
although the differences in age, residence in an MSA, and number of unique prescriptions widened. 
Examination of use of any of the included preventive services among the cohort sample 
shows that HDHP enrollees were slightly more likely than the non-HDHP group to use preventive 
services in 2010, and that gap widened in 2011 from 1.8 to 2.2 percentage points (Table 22). Any 
use increased significantly among the non-HDHP group from 63.0% in 2010 to 64.2% in 2011 
(p<0.01). Although any use in the HDHP increased by a larger magnitude (from 64.8% to 66.4%), 
the change was not statistically significant. Real average annual per capita total costs incurred for 
potentially covered preventive services grew during this time period (Table 22). Real per capita 
total costs increased on average by $51 for the non-HDHP group (from $627 to $678, p<0.01) and 
by $62 for the HDHP group (from $593 to $655, not significant). HDHP enrollees had higher 
average real per capita out-of-pocket costs for potentially eligible preventive services in both years 
than the non-HDHP enrollees (Table 22). Real out-of-pocket costs increased slightly on average 
among non-HDHP enrollees from $73 and $76 (p<0.05). The magnitude of the change was much 
larger among the HDHP group (from $91 to $102) but, once again, the change was not significant. 
The increases in preventive service use incentivized by and/or incidental to the policy change as 
part of a secular increasing trend were not met with the promised elimination or even a reduction 
in average out-of-pocket costs. 
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Table 23 shows the difference-in-difference estimates of the average treatment effect on 
the treated with the DID and SDID estimators. None of the models yielded a significant differential 
effect of HDHP enrollment on use of any potentially covered preventive service. Nor did we find 
any significant heterogenous treatment effects by sex or tertiles of the Elixhauser comorbidity 
index. Category-specific estimates (health promotion, cancer, chronic conditions, immunizations, 
reproductive health and pregnancy) of the average treatment effect on the treated are shown in 
Table 24. There is no evidence of a significant differential effect for any of the categories of 
preventive services that we defined. Service-specific estimates are shown in Table 25. Similarly, 
we find no evidence of a differential response to the policy change by HDHP enrollment using 
either estimator. 
We ran several alternate sets of models to confirm the robustness of our findings (not 
shown), including dropping all services used in the fourth quarter of either year (to wash out the 
time during which the policy took effect in 2010), dropping those aged 18 to 26 (those potentially 
eligible for the dependent coverage provision that was implemented coincident to this policy 
change), and using the subsample with a 12-month comorbidity look-back period (36 months of 
continuous enrollment rather than 30). None yielded statistically significant effect estimates after 
using a Bonferroni correction to adjust p-values appropriately for multiple comparisons.   
Discussion 
 We find no evidence to suggest that HDHP enrollment resulted in a differential response 
to the ACA provision that sought to eliminate cost sharing for certain preventive services. Unlike 
prior research, which has focused on a single or smaller set of preventive services (Fedewa et al., 
2015; Han et al., 2015; Mehta et al., 2015; Sabik & Adunlin, 2017; Wharam et al., 2016), we 
incorporate nearly all of the billable services that were subject to the late 2010 provision across 
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several categories of health care, including health promotion, cancer, chronic conditions, 
immunizations, and reproductive health and pregnancy. Compared to prior studies that used a 
single or limited set of health system or insurer data, we used a continuously enrolled cohort of 
nearly one hundred thousand individuals from a national database of commercial health insurance 
claims, improving the generalizability of our findings to the broader population. We already know 
that consumers respond to higher cost sharing burdens by reducing utilization of all care, regardless 
of its inherent clinical value. However, our analysis shows that HDHP enrollment is not associated 
with a differential response to the elimination of cost sharing for certain preventive services. Of 
particular note, we do not find lower uptake of screening for cancer among HDHP enrollees after 
the policy change, similar to other studies that have found null or positive effects (Fedewa et al., 
2015; Han et al., 2015; Wharam et al., 2016). 
Our study has several limitations. The potential endogeneous selection into HDHPs, 
assuming several plan options were available, is problematic given that we do not observe income, 
plan choice set, and other characteristics that could be used to model plan choice in insurance 
claims data (Crown, 2016). Others have addressed this problem by using forced switches into a 
HDHP at the employer level with similar non-switching employers serving as a control group 
(Wharam et al., 2011, 2012, 2016, 2018). We chose a more generalizable sample with a semi-
parametric approach that does not assume quasi-random group assignment, estimating an 
underlying propensity score for selection into treatment and using these to reweight the sample for 
estimation (Abadie, 2005). With only state identifiers available, we were unable to account for 
local differences in primary care provider availability that could play a role as a supply constraint 
for preventive services. However, this is primarily a concern for uninsured patients or those 
covered by Medicaid, particularly in the years prior to the Marketplace and Medicaid expansion 
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taking effect. We are, however, able to isolate the utilization response conditional on the physician 
supply environment that each enrollee observes by using a cohort of adults continuously enrolled 
before and after the policy change who do not move across state lines. We are also unable to 
identify which plans were modified to comply with this and other ACA provisions versus those 
that were grandfathered for the 2011 plan year, as this information is not provided in the 
MarketScan® data. Grandfathered plans have largely disappeared from the individual (non-group) 
market, now estimated to be less than 7% of total enrollment (Altman, 2017). In the group market, 
there is a similar downward trend with grandfathered plan enrollment falling from a base of just 
over half (56%) in 2011 to just over a third (36%) just two years later (Seiler, Malcarney, Horton, 
& Dafflitto, 2014). As long as grandfathered plan status was not associated with whether a plan 
had a high deductible or not (e.g., plan modification decisions being made at the insurer-rating 
area level or employer level rather than systematically for specific types of individual plans), this 
concern is minimized for our analysis. Similarly, grandfathered plan status has implications for 
whether the exogenous price shock for preventive services was perceived or real.  
Insurers were also responsible for creating their own preventive service coding guidelines 
to operationalize the ACA provision that eliminated cost sharing for certain services, with 
providers needing to adhere specifically in order for enrollees to be billed (or not, in this case) 
appropriately. Consumers and providers alike ended up being confused by this, with patients 
receiving surprise bills for so-called ‘free’ preventive services (Andrews, 2014; Konrad, 2011; 
LaMontagne, 2015). As we cannot identify specific insurers in our data, it is not possible to match 
the applicable coding guidelines exactly to each enrollee. We created a comprehensive list of 
covered diagnosis and procedure code combinations provided by the federal government and 
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several large insurers to capture a reasonable universe of services that were targeted for the 
elimination of cost sharing in non-grandfathered plans.  
As higher deductibles become the norm in both employer-sponsored plans and the 
Marketplace, placing downward pressure on the use of medical care generally, we may need more 
innovative approaches to benefit design to encourage utilization of high-value preventive services. 
Value-based insurance design, which ties cost sharing to clinical value rather than specific dollar 
thresholds or percentages across all and/or a class of services (e.g., reducing or eliminating cost 
sharing for medications to treat chronic conditions), has shown promise in limited research thus 
far. For example, VBID has been shown to improve medication adherence without increasing total 
health care expenditures though its effects on clinical outcomes are mixed (Agarwal, Gupta, & 
Fendrick, 2018), and considerations regarding VBID targeting certain preventive services, such as 
screenings, which are infrequent and targeted toward a broad population including healthy 
individuals, likely differ from those in the context of chronic disease management.  
Plan choice and understanding the nuances of benefit design is challenging for consumers, 
often resulting in less than optimal choices of plans (e.g., choosing dominated plans) and utilization 
behavior (e.g., failing to use high-value preventive care available without cost sharing) (Bhargava, 
Loewenstein, & Sydnor, 2015; Sinaiko & Hirth, 2011; Sinaiko, Ross-Degnan, Soumerai, Lieu, & 
Galbraith, 2013), suggesting that more can be done during open enrollment and early in the plan 
year to support decision making (Wong et al., 2016, 2018). There are also potential mismatches 
between ex ante and ex post expectations of cost sharing for prevention. An extreme but fairly 
common example is that a patient goes in for a screening colonoscopy (not subject to cost sharing 
under this provision) but a polyp is found and removed causing the service to be billed as a 
diagnostic colonoscopy instead (subject to cost sharing). This change in cost sharing based on the 
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outcome of the preventive service itself is far from consumer-friendly and has yielded a lot of 
confusion (American Cancer Society, 2018; Andrews, 2018; Colorectal Cancer Alliance, 2016). 
Unfortunately, our results suggest that the provision of the ACA that eliminated cost 
sharing for certain preventive services was seemingly unsuccessful in reducing out-of-pocket costs 
for consumers, the linchpin incentive for consumers to increase use of preventive services. If use 
of preventive services is less than optimal and costs continue to be a barrier, then examination of 
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Figure 15. Real out-of-pocket costs for potentially covered preventive services by HDHP 
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Table 18. Preventive services covered without cost sharing by non-grandfathered plans 
Service Eligible population in analysis (by sex and age) 
Health promotion  
Wellness visit All 
Cancer  
Breast cancer screening Women, 40 and older 
Breast cancer genetic screening and counseling, 
chemoprevention Women 
Cervical cancer screening Women, 21 and older 
Colorectal cancer screening All, 50 and older 
Lung cancer screening All, 55 and older 
Chronic conditions  
Lipid disorder screening All 
Diabetes screening All 
Hepatitis B screening All 
Hepatitis C screening All, 40 and older 
Obesity screening and counseling All 
Osteoporosis screening Women 
Immunizations  
Flu All 
Other immunizations All 
Reproductive health and pregnancy  
Sexually transmitted infection (STI) screening All 
Anemia screening Pregnant women 




Table 19. Underlying preventive services included 
 
Service Underlying services included 
Health promotion  
Wellness visit 
Initial and periodic preventive evaluation and management visits (i.g., well 
adult, well woman), blood pressure checks, alcohol misuse screening and 
counseling, intimate partner violence screening and counseling, tobacco 
counseling and cessation interventions, depression screening, sexual health 
counseling 
Cancer  
Breast cancer screening Mammography 






screening Pap test 
Colorectal cancer 
screening 
Fecal occult blood test (FOBT),  fecal immunochemical test (FIT),  
sigmoidoscopy, colonoscopy 
Lung cancer screening Tomography 
Chronic conditions  
Lipid disorder 
screening – 
Diabetes screening – 
Hepatitis B screening – 
Hepatitis C screening – 
Obesity screening  
and counseling – 




Haemophilus influenzae type b; hepatitis A; hepatitis B; human 
papillomavirus (HPV); meningococcal; measles, mumps, and rubella 
(MMR); pneumococcal; tetanus; varicella; zoster 




Chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
Anemia screening – 




Table 20. Diagnosis and procedure codes used to identify preventive services in claims 
 
Service Diagnosis codes Procedure codes 
Health promotion   
Wellness visit 
ICD-9: V692, V745, V030, V031, V032, V033, V034, V035, 
V036, V037, V038, V0381, V0382, V0389, V039, V040, V041, 
V042, V044, V044, V045, V046, V047, V048, V0481, V0482, 
V0489, V049, V050, V051, V052, V053, V054, V058, V059, 
V060, V061, V062, V063, V064, V065, V066, V068, V069, 
V200, V201, V202, V203, V2031, V2032, V242, V6511, V6542, 
V6549, V700, V708, V709, V723, V7231, V762, V7646, V7647, 
V790, V791, V793, V798, V799, V811, V8402, V8404, V653, 
V6542, V6544, V6545, 3051 
ICD-10: Z761, Z762, Z00121, Z00129, Z00110, Z00111, Z7681, 
Z0000, Z0001, Z008, Z01411, Z01419, Z134, Z136, Z0130, 
Z0133, Z003, Z1331, Z1332, Z1389, Z713, Z717, Z7141 
99201, 99202, 99203, 99204, 99205, 99211, 99212, 
99213, 99214, 99215, 99381, 99382, 99383, 99384, 
99385, 99386, 99387, 99388, 99389, 99390, 99391, 
99392, 99393, 99394, 99395, 99396, 99397, S0610, 
S0612, S0613, 99420, 96110, 96127, S0302, 97802, 
97803, 97804, S9470, G0442, G0443, G0444, 
G0446, G0447, G0451, G0473, 99401, 99402, 
99403, 99404, S9443, 99406, 99407, 99408, 99409, 
99410, 99411, 99412, G0101, G0334, G0402, 
G0436, G0437, G0438, G0439, G0445, G0396, 
G0397, C9801, C9802, S9075, S9453, 96150, 
96152, 96153, 0403T 
Cancer   
Breast cancer 
screening 
ICD-9: V7610, V7611, V7612, V7619, V103, V163 
ICD-10: Z1231, Z803, Z853 
77055, 77056, 77057, 77051, 77052, 77063, 77067, 






ICD-9: V700, V7231, V103, V1043, V163, V1641, V2633 
ICD-10: Z853, Z8543, Z803, Z315, Z8041, Z8042, Z1501, 
Z1502 
96040, S0265, S18212, S18213, S18214, S18215, 
S18216, S18217, 99201, 99202, 99203, 99204, 
99205, 99211, 99212, 99213, 99214, 99215, 99385, 
99386, 99387, 99395, 99396, 99397, 99401, 99402, 
99403, 99404, 81211, 81212, 81213, 81214, 81215, 
81216, 81217, 81162, G0463 
Cervical cancer 
screening 
ICD-9: V242, V723, V7620, V726, V7260, V7262, V7646, 
V7647, V8402, V8404, V762, V700, V7231, V7232, V7381 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z0001, Z01411, Z0142, Z01419, Z1151, Z124, 
Z7721, Z779 
88141, 88142, 88143, 88144, 88145, 88146, 88147, 
88148, 88149, 88150, 88151, 88152, 88153, 88154, 
88155, 88156, 88157, 88158, 88159, 88160, 88161, 
88162, 88163, 88164, 88165, 88166, 88167, 88168, 
88169, 88170, 88171, 88172, 88173, 88174, 88175, 
G0101, G0123, G0124, G0141, G0143, G0144, 








ICD-9: V160, V1851, V1859, V700, V7262, V7641, V7650, 
V7651, V7652, V160, V1851 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z8379, Z1210, Z1211, Z1212, Z1213, Z800, 
Z8371, Z0001, Z01411, Z01419, R195, Z8379 
44388, 44389, 44392, 44393, 44394, 45300, 45301, 
45302, 45303, 45304, 45305, 45306, 45307, 45308, 
45309, 45310, 45311, 45312, 45313, 45314, 45315, 
45316, 45317, 45318, 45319, 45320, 82270, 82274, 
G0328, 45330, 45331, 45332, 45333, 45334, 45335, 
45338, 45339, 45340, 45346, G0104, G0105, 45378, 
45379, 45380, 45381, 45382, 45383, 45384, 45385, 
45386, 45388, G0105, G0121, 74263, 74270, 72480, 
G0106, G0107, G0120, G0122, 00810, 00812, 88304, 
88305, G0328, G0394, S0601, S3890, 81528, 99152, 
99153, 99156, 99157, G0500, 99201, 99202, 99203, 
99204, 99205, 99211, 99212, 99213, 99214, 99215, 
99241, 99242, 99243, 99244, 99245, S0285 
Lung cancer 
screening 
ICD-9: V1582, V760 
ICD-10: Z122, Z87891, F17210, F17211, F17213, F17218, 
F17219 
71250, 76497, S8032, S8092, G0296, G0297 
Chronic conditions   
Lipid disorder 
screening 
ICD-9: V700, V7791 or hypertension or diabetesa 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z0001, Z13220, Z136, Z8249  
or hypertension or diabetesa 
36415, 36416, 80061, 82465, 83718, 83719, 83721, 
84478 
Diabetes screening ICD-9: V700, V771 or hypertension
a 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z131 or hypertensiona 




ICD-9: V7262, V7389 or pregnancya 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z0001, Z1159, Z578, Z00129  
or pregnancya 




ICD-9: V692, V200, V201, V202, V220, V221, V222, V230, 
V231, V232, V233, V234, V2341, V2342, V2349, V235, 
V237, V238, V2381, V2382, V2383, V2384, V2385, V2386, 
V2387, V2389, V239, V240, V241, V242, V700, V723, 
V7231, V7262, V7389 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z00129 
36415, 36416, 86803, 86804, 87522, G0472 
Obesity screening  
and counseling 
ICD-9: V700, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2724, 2725, 2726, 
2727, 2728, 2729, V653, V778, Z713, V8530, V8531, 
V8532, V8533, V8534, V8535, V8536, V8537, V8538, 
V8539, V8541, V8542, V8543, V8544, V8545, 27800, 
27801 or hypertension or diabetesa 
97802, 97803, 97804, S9470, G0446, 
G0447, G0473, 99401, 99402, 99403, 99404, 99411, 





ICD-10: Z6830, Z6831, Z6832, Z6833, Z6834, Z6835, 
Z6836, Z6837, Z6838, Z6839, Z6841, Z6842, Z6843, Z6844, 




ICD-9: V8281, V1781, V4981, V700, V720, V723, V7231 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z0001, Z13820, Z8262 
76070, 76071, 76075, 76076, 76078, 76977, 77078, 
77079, 77080, 77081, 77083, 78350, G0130 
 
Immunizations   
Flu 
ICD-9: V202, V700, V035, V036, V037, V0381, V0382, 
V0389, V040, V042, V043, V046, V048, V0481, V0489, 
V053, V054, V061, V062, V063, V064, V065, V066, V068, 
V069 
ICD-10: Z00121, Z00129, Z0000, Z0001, Z23 
90630, 90653, 90654, 90656, 90658, 90660, 90661, 
90662, 90664, 90666, 90667, 90668, 90672, 90673, 
90674, 90682, 90686, 90688, 90756, Q2033, Q2034, 
Q2035, Q2036, Q2037, Q2038, Q2039 
Other immunizations 
ICD-9: V202, V700, V035, V036, V037, V0381, V0382, 
V0389, V040, V042, V043, V046, V048, V0481, V0489, 
V053, V054, V061, V062, V063, V064, V065, V066, V068, 
V069 
ICD-10: Z00121, Z00129, Z0000, Z0001, Z23 
90460, 90461, 90465, 90466, 90467, 90468, 90470, 
90471, 90472, 90473, 90474, G0008, G0009, G0010, 
G0377, G9141, J3530, 90620, 90621, 90631, 90632, 
90633, 90634, 90635, 90636, 90637, 90638, 90639, 
90640, 90641, 90642, 90643, 90644, 90645, 90646, 
90647, 90648, 90649, 90650, 90651, 90659, 90669, 
90670, 90671, 90683, 90684, 90697, 90698, 90699, 
90701, 90703, 90704, 90705, 90706, 90707, 90708, 
90709, 90710, 90711, 90712, 90713, 90714, 90715, 
90716, 90718, 90719, 90720, 90721, 90722, 90732, 
90733, 90734, 90736, 90739, 90740, 90741, 90742, 
90745, 90746, 90747, 90748, 90750, S0195 




ICD-9: V692, V200, V201, V202, V234, V238, V240, V241, 
V242, V700, V723, V7231, V7262, V7388, V7389, V7398, 
V745, V759, V700, V745, V749, V759 or pregnancya 
ICD-10: Z0000, Z0001, Z0189, Z118, Z224, Z7251, Z7252, 
Z7253, Z7721, Z779, Z226, Z228, Z229, Z113, Z114, Z1159, 
Z119, Z206, Z112, Z119, Z202, Z124, Z118, Z113, Z114 or 
pregnancya 
80055, 86780, 36415, 36416, 86631, 86632, 86689, 
87110, 87270, 87320, 87490, 87491, 87492, 87801, 
87810, 87850, 87590, 87591, 87592, 86701, 86702, 
86703, 87389, 87390, 87391, G0432, G0433, G0435, 
G0450, G0475, S3645, 86592, 86593, 87534, 87535, 
87806, 99401, 99402, 99403, 99404 







a 81007, 87086, 87088 
Note: Only outpatient claims from a non-emergency department facility were included. One or more diagnosis codes and a relevant procedure code must be 
included in the claim for it to be flagged as an eligible preventive service. 





Table 21. Unweighted and weighted baseline (2010) sample characteristics by HDHP 
enrollment, cohort sample 
 







Not in HDHP HDHP Not in HDHP HDHP 














Relationship to policy holder  





















Employment status of policy holder 





















Employment classification of policy holder 


























































Elixhauser comorbidity index 









* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
DID – parametric difference-in-difference (OLS), SDID – semi-parametric difference-in-differences (Abadie), 





Table 22. Any use of and unconditional real costs for potentially covered preventive 
services by HDHP enrollment, cohort sample 
 
 % (SE) 
Mean 
(SE) 
Outcome Any preventive service use Real total costs Real out-of-pocket costs 
Year 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 






















* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Table 23. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of HDHP enrollment on any use of 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any preventive service use 







Adjusted R2 0.123 0.128 0.173 0.194 







Demographic controls X X X X 
Geographic controls  X X X 
# of inpatient admissions 
and unique 
prescriptions 
  X X 
Comorbidity indicators 
(1 year lookback)    X 
N (persons) 93,176 93,176 93,176 93,176 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
P-values adjusted using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 





Table 24. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of HDHP enrollment on category-
specific use of potentially covered preventive services in 2011, cohort sample  
 




























N (persons) 93,176 65,152 93,176 93,176 93,176 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
All models include demographic controls, geographic controls, number of inpatient admissions, number of unique 
prescriptions, and Elixhauser condition indicators. P-values adjusted using Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. 




Table 25. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of HDHP enrollment on service-






Health promotion   
Wellness visit -0.005 (0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Cancer   
Breast cancer screening -0.001 (0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 

















Lung cancer screening 0.0004 (0.003) 
0.0004 
(0.003) 
Chronic conditions   
Lipid disorder screening -0.006 (0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
Diabetes screening -0.005 (0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
Hepatitis B screening 0.003 (0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.003) 
Hepatitis C screening 0.003 (0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 






Osteoporosis screening 0.0004 (0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
Immunizations   
Flu -0.009 (0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Other immunizations -0.009 (0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
Reproductive health and 








Anemia screening 0.006 (0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Bacteriurea screening 0.006 (0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
All models include demographic controls, geographic controls, number of inpatient admissions, number of unique 
prescriptions, and Elixhauser condition indicators. P-values adjusted using Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons. 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Implications 
This research has implications for our understanding of the impact of coverage expansion 
and increased generosity of coverage on use of the ED, primary care, and preventive services. 
Coverage itself plays a significant role in providing access to non-ED providers and financial risk 
protection from the costs of health care, but does not appear to be enough on its own to yield 
reductions in ED use. All coverage is not created equal and simply enrolling more people is not 
going to change health behaviors, patterns of health care use, or improve health, particularly when 
being insured does not necessarily make using care affordable or ensure receipt of high-quality 
care (H. Allen et al., 2014; Polyakova et al., 2017).  
Based on Chapter 2, I find that the long-term uninsured significantly increase their use of 
primary care in the year after gaining coverage but it is not accompanied by substitution away 
from using the ED, at least in the short run. The more than one visit per year average increase in 
primary care visits among the persistently uninsured after gaining coverage was driven by those 
gaining public coverage (e.g., Medicaid) with no significant change among those gaining private 
insurance. This bodes well for increasing primary care use under proposed and potential future 
Medicare or Medicaid-based coverage expansions (e.g., Medicare for all, Medicare for more, 
Medicaid buy-ins), but less so under models where the private market drives expansion with 
enrollees exposed to significant cost sharing burdens. The mixed findings on the effects of 
coverage gains for the previously transiently uninsured are important to explore further as a more 
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permissive stance towards state Medicaid waiver provisions under the Trump administration will 
allow states to experiment with work requirements that will almost certainly increase churn and 
decrease average enrollee time in coverage. As we explore proposals both to bring the remaining 
uninsured into coverage and simultaneously those that will increase churn and disenrollment, it 
will be important to consider the profile of persistence of uninsurance among the relevant 
population as a piece of the puzzle in projecting effects on health care use and the resulting costs. 
One could hope that substantial health care needs and pent-up demand for primary care 
would eventually result in ED use trailing off as coverage gains persist over time, with earlier 
intervention and/or guideline concordant preventive care mitigating the factors that result in the 
need for many of those ED visits. However, the results from Chapter 3 indicate that population-
level increases in insurance coverage do not yield lower rates of avoidable ED use several years 
out among non-elderly adults. The emergence of urgent care centers and retail clinics as channels 
to increase primary care supply and provide a lower cost setting for time-sensitive care hold 
promise but are not a silver bullet. Improved access to alternative settings, such as community 
health centers, retail clinics, and urgent care centers, should theoretically allow for declines in ED 
use over time but encouraging findings are offset by others that are less so, with a lack of cost 
savings demonstrated by greater penetration of these facilities thus far (Alexander et al., 2017; L. 
Allen et al., 2019; Ashwood et al., 2016; Martsolf et al., 2017). 
It is encouraging that those in high deductible health plans did not exhibit a differential 
response to the ACA provision that eliminated cost sharing for certain preventive services, as 
shown in Chapter 4. However, there is little evidence to suggest that out-of-pocket costs actually 
declined for patients and use of many of the covered services is still well below Healthy People 
2020 goals. Consumers and providers have both been confused and frustrated, likely a result of 
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the fragmented implementation with each insurer defining their own reimbursement guidelines in 
order to have a preventive service claim qualify as having no cost sharing to the patient, resulting 
in surprise bills for what were expected to be ‘free’ preventive services (Andrews, 2014; Konrad, 
2011; LaMontagne, 2015). As high deductible plans approach comprising half of the commercially 
insured market, we may need more innovative benefit designs that recognize the variation in 
clinical value and other barriers (e.g., multiple visits, cost of potential treatment) in order to 
substantially increase use of high-value preventive services. 
As a nation, we are still grappling with two very different ideological points of view around 
what health insurance and the financing of health care should look like. We spend a greater 
percentage of our gross domestic product on health care than any other developed economy with 
middling results in terms of health and life expectancy compared to our peers. Some are pushing 
to abolish the existing fragmented system of health insurance coverage and replace it with a single-
payer system, eliminating all or nearly all cost sharing to patients and creating significant 
administrative efficiencies. Others seek to roll back the protections and coverage gains made under 
the Affordable Care Act by providing significantly more state flexibility (and therefore, variation) 
in minimum coverage requirements and Medicaid eligibility and funding, reverting to a 
dramatically more federalist system in which the coverage environment in traditionally 
Democratic states will look starkly different to those in Republican strongholds. In the meantime, 
we continue to struggle with affordability of medical innovation even for those in generous 
commercial insurance plans and Medicare, with emerging therapies coming to market with eye-
popping six figure list prices. There are no easy solutions regardless of the market structure. There 
are fundamental tradeoffs that have to be made, and are being made under the status quo, providing 




Medicaid was passed along with Medicare in 1965 to provide health insurance coverage to 
low-income, disabled, and other vulnerable populations and has become the largest health 
insurance program in the United States, now covering over 65 million people (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2019). As a state-federal partnership program, the federal government 
sets minimum eligibility criteria and benefits that states must adhere to in exchange for bearing a 
majority of the cost. However, states are allowed to modify those eligibility criteria and benefits 
through demonstration projects that “assist in promoting the objectives of the Medicaid program” 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.-a). These demonstration projects, granted 
under waiver authority provided in section 1115 of the Social Security Act, have been used as a 
way to redesign state Medicaid programs and less so for rigorous evaluation of how to improve 
the program (Government Accountability Office, 2018). Medicaid expansion under the ACA has 
shown positive effects on health and financial well-being but as states now seek to rein in Medicaid 
enrollment and spending through waivers, it is important to understand how these waivers interact 
with the goal of “keeping America healthy” (Mazurenko, Balio, Agarwal, Carroll, & Menachemi, 
2018; Miller, Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, & Wong, 2018). 
Former Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price encouraged states to explore 
work requirements, pledging to “support innovative approaches…that build on the human dignity 
that comes with…employment”, despite evidence that “[m]ost Medicaid enrollees who can work 
are already working” (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018b; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2017). In Arkansas, the first state to implement a work requirements program, more than 
17,000 Medicaid enrollees had been disenrolled from coverage through December 2018 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2018c). Eleven states have submitted waiver applications to impose work 
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requirements in their state Medicaid programs, with a range of nearly zero to 5% of Medicaid-
eligible persons estimated to be subject to them but not in compliance (Silvestri, Holland, & Ross, 
2018). State and federal administrative and survey data sources (e.g., Medicaid enrollment reports, 
NHIS, MEPS, CPS, SIPP) can be used to examine how enrollment patterns are changing with 
work requirements, including disparities by race, ethnicity, and disability, and their impacts on use 
of and foregone health care. Pharmacy claims and/or electronic prescribing data could also be used 
to identify changes in medication adherence for affected populations with chronic conditions, such 
as diabetes and hypertension, which puts patients at risk of life-threatening adverse events and 
health systems on the hook for expensive uncompensated emergency care. 
Retroactive eligibility allows medical expenses to be covered for three months prior to the 
date of application for Medicaid, as long as one would have been eligible, protecting patients from 
financial ruin if they experience a major illness or injury. An approved 1115 waiver for Iowa in 
2017 eliminated this benefit, not only in the Medicaid expansion population but nearly everyone 
eligible for the program without any explicit requirement to evaluate its impact (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2017). Other states have approved waivers awaiting implementation or are seeking 
approval for waivers that would remove retroactive eligibility from their state Medicaid programs. 
There has been almost no research to date quantifying the amount of care paid for using this benefit 
or evaluating the effects of removing retroactive eligibility on financial outcomes for Medicaid 
enrollees, despite several states having exemptions prior to the ACA and more seeking them now. 
Large federal surveys, like those noted above, and novel data sources, like credit reports and bank 
transactions, could be used to assess how financial burdens changed among Medicaid eligible 
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